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Foreword
The AICPA Tax D ivision’s Task Force on Changing our Tax System to Encourage
Savings and Investment Relative to Consumption was formed in 1981 in response to
national concern over the low level of savings and capital reinvestment relative to other
industralized nations. Since the tax force was formed, the U .S. has provided substantially
increased capital-formation incentives; the nation continues to have a low rate of invest
ment relative to consumption, however, and to suffer severe balance of paym ent deficits to
other countries that are reinvesting more heavily. A t the same time, the U .S. has been
examining alternative tax systems designed to encourage sim plicity, fairness, and capital
formation. We believe that this study can contribute significantly to an understanding of
the problem and to possible alternative approaches to encourage savings and investment
relative to consumption.
The task force comprises the following members:
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Stephen J. Epstein
Peter J, Hart
In addition, Sarah Bonner and Dwayne Horii, of the University of Michigan, served as
graduate student assistants, developing drafts under the direction of the task force;
William Stromsem of the AICPA provided staff support. The task force also wishes to thank
the Value-Added Tax Task Force for its important contribution in that topic area.
The task force reports to the T ax Policy Subcommittee, and through it, to the Tax D ivi
sion Executive Comm ittee. Members of those committees when the report was approved
were as follows.
Executive Com m ittee

Tax Policy Subcom m ittee
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been widespread publicity concerning the decline in produc
tivity, saving, and investment in the United States. Some of the media’s attention has
focused on the decline relative to other industrialized nations, while other coverage has
emphasized the decline from past U .S. rates. M any economists, government officials, and
others have expounded reasons for the declining rates, including the influence of govern
ment policies.
This report is premised on the assumption that increasing saving and investment is
desirable. W ithin the range of government policies influencing productivity and saving,
the tax system is pervasive. It has proven an efficient means of providing economic incen
tives and, hence, can be used either to encourage or discourage saving and investment.
Thus, the report addresses those tax alternatives that encourage relatively more saving and
relatively less consumption (in the business context, the parallel concept would be the
encouragement of capital formation).
The Am erican Institute of Certified Public Accountants is well-acquainted with tax
law s; hence, the thrust of this study document is to analyze potential changes in those laws.
However, tax laws are not the sole, or perhaps the best, vehicle for influencing saving and
investment. M any economists advocate that a better method would be to reduce govern
ment deficits or expenditures or both, while others defend the use of monetary policy. Still
others propose changing government regulations and moderating inflation. While all these
views are worthy of discussion, the scope of this study document is lim ited to potential
changes in tax laws.
The report examines potential changes to our tax system in three broad areas. First, it
investigates a more comprehensive income base that would permit significantly lower
rates. This area encompasses a number of current congressional bills as well as the Novem 
ber, 1984 Treasury Departm ent simplification proposals. Next, the report examines the
taxation of consumption rather than income (also the subject of several current proposals).
Finally, it addresses changes that can be made to the current income tax system to
encourage saving relative to consumption. Although each of the alternatives affects saving
and capital formation in different ways, no policy stance or recommendation is made with
respect to any of them. As a study document, this report is intended to inform AICPA mem
bers and others of issues and alternatives relating to the subjects within its scope, but it is
not designed to set forth any policy position of the AICPA or its Federal Tax Division.
This study draws upon numerous sources for suggestions and analysis; two of the most
important are Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, the classic reference in the area of tax
reform, which was published by the Departm ent of the Treasury in 1977, and the 1984
Treasury Report on Tax Sim plification and Reform.1 Both Blueprints and the Treasury
proposals contain substantial contributions to knowledge on the subject of tax reform;
they, as well as the other materials in the bibliography, should be studied carefully by the
serious and interested reader.

1

It should be noted throughout that reference to the “ Treasury proposals” is to those of
November 1984. W hile the 1985 Administration proposals vary, this document has used
April 30 , 1985, as a cutoff point for any proposals. Consideration of later m aterial would not
add m aterially to knowledge of the issues involved and would delay release of the study
unduly.
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Chapter 1

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The claim that Americans save too little has become the topic of much debate in recent
years. Those who make the claim cite two reasons for believing that the saving rate is too
low. T hey compare the U .S. rate w ith those of other industrialized countries; usually, the
U .S. rate is near the bottom of the lists. T hey also compare the U .S. rate with prior U .S.
rates and report a declining trend. T he tables below illustrate these claims.

Table 1

Net Household Saving as a Percentage of Disposable Household Income,
1960-1982

1960-67
1968-73
1974-79
1980
1981
1982

U.S.

Canada

United Kingdom

West Germany

Japan

8.0
9.2
8.8
8.0
8.5
7.7

5.7
6.9
10.6
12.6
14.1
15.5

5.6
5.5
8.1
11.1
8.7
7.1

16.4
14.7
13.3
12.8
13.6
13.0

17.0
18.2
21.4
19.2
19.7
17.7

Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Economic Outlook.
Historical Statistics 1960-1982.

Table 2

U.S. Personal Saving (National Income Account Basis) as a
Percentage of Disposable Personal Income, 1961-1984
6.3
7.3
8.1
6.1
6.7
6.2
5.0
6.1

1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
1976-80
1981
1982
1983
1984

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey o f Current
Business (Washington, D.C.: USDC, 1985)
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Opponents of this argument attack the definition of saving used in tables such as table 2.
In general, saving refers to the flow of income and production into uses other than current
consumption; however, the statistics used in these two tables do not measure all of the con
sumption deferred or capital accum ulated. In the National Income Account (NIA) statis
tics, saving is a residual — equal to disposable income, less current personal outlays for
goods, services (including the estim ated value of housing services), interest, and transfers
to foreigners. The N IA concept of personal saving does not include durable consumer
goods, which permit consumption in the future, or the changes in market value of existing
assets. Thus, the N IA statistics understate the amount of consumption deferred.
Another definition of savings that includes accum ulation of durable goods is the flow-offunds basis, used by the Federal Reserve. Flow-of-funds household saving is equal to the
increase in household stocks of durable goods, nonfarm homes, and noncorporate assets,
less depreciation of those assets, plus net investment in financial assets, less increases in
household debt. Personal saving on a flow-of-funds basis equals flow-of-funds household
saving, less government insurance and pension reserve, net investment in consumer durables,
capital gains dividends from m utual funds, and net saving by farm corps. Using the flowof-funds basis, the U .S. saving rate becomes nearly a quarter higher than the rate provided
in N IA statistics (see table 3).

Table 3

Household Saving, Personal Saving, and Personal Saving as a Percentage
of Disposable Personal Income (Flow-of-Funds Basis).
1960-1984 (In Billions of Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates)

1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

Household Saving

Personal Saving

Percentage of Disposable Income

36.7
65.0
86.4
153.0
234.7
273.9
296.3
300.3
354.0

26.2
39.1
56.7
111.1
165.3
192.0
209.7
175.8
204.6

7.4
8.2
8.6
10.1
9.0
9.4
9.6
7.5
7.9

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Summary Statistics
(Washington, D.C.:FRS, 1985)

The unanswered question is why the U .S. saving rate is so low. M any economists blame
the low rate on government policies, which they believe generate a fear of saving or a disin
centive for saving. Some of the major policies are incorporated in tax laws. The social
security system is another possible saving disincentive, as are other government retirement
programs, which make saving seemingly unnecessary. Credit market rules, which have
encouraged extensive borrowing and lim ited returns to small savers, have also been blamed
for discouraging saving. Finally, economists cite government deficits and monetary policy
as causes of a low saving rate.
Present tax laws affect personal saving in a number of ways. First, the deductibility of
interest expense is an incentive for borrowing. Individuals borrow for two reasons — saving
(investment) and consumption. Borrowing for saving has no effect on overall saving rates;
that is, it is neutral toward savings. However, borrowing for consumption removes funds
4

that can otherwise be used for saving or investment and is, therefore, anti-savings. The
overall effect of the two types of borrowing then is anti-savings. The deduction of interest
expense certainly provides a large disincentive for creating new saving, since income from
saving is taxed and expenses of borrowing (dissaving) are deductible. Interestingly, what
lim its already exist in the tax code on deductibility of interest expense (sections 163(d),
265) restrict interest on investment borrowing but not on that for consumption. Thus,
unpopular as it would be to many taxpayers, eliminating the consumer-loan-interest
deduction would serve to increase saving relative to consumption.
A second area of the tax laws that discourages saving is the double (or more) taxation of
savings: “ first, when earned as income; and second, as the income from the investment that
the saving generates comes in.” 2 Savings m ay also be taxed a third time, from capital gains
on the sale of assets purchased with savings (even if those gains are solely from inflation).
D avid Raboy has summed this up in his testimony before a Senate subcommittee: “ As a
result, the tax system penalizes savings at both ends, it subsidizes those who dissave while
taxing those who do save.” 3
A third potential disincentive to saving and investment is double taxation of corporate
dividends, once when earned by the corporation and once when paid to shareholders. The
Blueprints study has addressed this problem, and concluded that current tax rules have
the effect of discouraging investment.
The separate taxation of income earned in corporations is responsible for a num ber of serious
economic distortions. It raises the overall rate of taxation on earnings from capital and so pro
duces a bias against saving and investment. It inhibits the flow of saving to corporate equities
relative to other forms of investm ent.4
The study notes that integration of corporate and individual taxes should serve to aid the
problem of misallocation of resources created by double taxation and, hence, enhance
investment. Integration could also aid in increasing personal saving by eliminating the
double taxation of corporate dividends.
There are several alternatives that can alleviate the economic distortions caused by cor
porate taxation. One such approach would treat all corporations as partnerships and allo
cate corporate income to shareholders. This approach is theoretically ideal, but suffers
from enormous record-keeping difficulties. Another would be to repeal the corporate tax
altogether, which would carry major transition, equity, and political problems. Other
alternatives include expanding the dividends-received exclusion and implementing a
dividends-received credit. Such alternatives would not resolve the economic distortions, as
corporations would still favor debt over equity.
Two alternatives that have received attention in prior years are the dividends-paid
deduction and the “ gross-up m ethod.” The dividends-paid deduction approach would
allow a tax deduction to corporations for dividends distributed to shareholders and would
thereby remove the disparities between debt and equity financing. (In lim ited form, this is
the approach of the 1984 Treasury proposals.)5 A problem with the deduction, however, is
that it encourages distributions of earnings and, as such, m ay impede growth. Further
more, the corporate tax would still exist for undistributed earnings and, as it does currently,
may impede saving and investment to some extent.
Under the gross-up method, the shareholder includes in income dividends received and
the corporate tax attributable to such dividends (gross-up). The shareholder is then
allowed a tax credit for the amount of the gross-up. Under this method dividends would be
more attractive to the investor than interest, and, hence, might enhance investment.
Either of these methods, then, may serve to stim ulate investment.
The availability of funds for capital formation m ay also be reduced by the interest
expense deduction. Businesses certainly have an incentive to borrow for investment pur
poses. T hey receive the deduction for interest as well as the deduction for depreciation and
the investment tax credit if the funds are used to purchase applicable property. However,

5

individual taxpayers often favor housing and durable goods as investments over financial
assets such as stocks and bonds. Taxpayers make such choices because borrowing for their
purchases generates a tax deduction, and the flow of services from housing and durable
goods is not taxed. It is not clear what the magnitude of the effect on investment is or to
what extent investment would increase were the deduction removed. However, relative to a
tax system with no personal-interest-expense deduction, the current system provides dis
incentives for investment.
The potential results of low saving and investment are the basis for the underlying
assumption of this report that higher saving and investment are desirable. M artin Feldstein,
former chairman of President Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, has noted
Increasing the rate of capital accum ulation m ust rem ain one of the central and continuing
long-run goals of economic policy. A higher rate of capital formation is the most dependable
way to increase productivity and to raise our nation’s rate of economic growth___Our low rate
of capital formation means th a t we as a nation are passing up the opportunity to earn a high
rate of return and to raise our future standard of living.6
And, former Treasury Secretary W illiam E. Simon writes the following:
Our treatm ent of individual savings and investment income is in sharp contrast to the pref
erential tax treatm ent of such incomes in most other industrialized countries. [And] although
our treatm ent of corporate capital income is especially severe, the tax code includes numerous
tax breaks to specific kinds of capital income th a t service to misallocate our lim ited invest
m ent resources. . . . All of this is done for the purpose of meeting specific social objectives th at
m ight otherwise be neglected. There is, however, little hard evidence to show th a t such con
cessions are successful in meeting their goals or th a t the benefits th a t follow exceed the costs
associated with the misallocation of our scarce capital resources.7
These are profound implications, indeed — the United States has typically been a world
leader in developing new technologies, increasing output and living standards, and the
like; declining investment is already showing signs of diminishing that position. Hence, it
is important to look to alternatives for improving saving and investment in the United
States — and, it is hoped, thereby improving capital formation and productivity. Our tax
system can play an important role in this process, and it is to that end that the following dis
cussion is aimed.

6

Chapter 2

ALTERNATIVE TAX SYSTEMS
As a starting point for focusing on use of the tax system to encourage saving relative to
consumption, the chart on the next page illustrates possible primary tax systems. This sec
tion contains a brief discussion of each alternative and reasons for excluding or including
the alternative in the report.
When considering an alternative tax system or proposing changes to the present one,
several issues require attention. The first is whether the base should be income or non
income — where a non-income base m ay be measured by expenditures, value, or receipts.
The second issue, once a base has been chosen, is its breadth — from very narrow to com
prehensive. The present U .S. system lies somewhere between the extremes, as do most cur
rent proposals.
A third issue is the rate structure to be coupled with the base. The structure can range
from nonprogressive (either regressive or “ fla t” ) to steeply progressive. When transac
tional taxes are considered, the choice is between a single rate or a multi-rate structure.
Finally, the tim ing of taxation must be considered. The current U .S. system taxes on a
periodic basis, whereas some systems tax by transaction or on a cum ulative basis. E ach of
the tax systems reflected in the chart is briefly described in the following paragraphs,
referenced to its corresponding number.

Chart References and Discussion of Alternative Tax Systems
(1) The noncomprehensive-base, progressive-rate tax system defines the current U .S.
income tax. Our system already includes some incentives for saving, such as Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), nontaxation of life insurance cash-surrender value, limited
dividend exclusion, and so on. The system also includes some major saving disincentives,
discussed in the introduction to this report.
(2) M aintaining a noncomprehensive base and instituting a nonprogressive rate struc
ture would most likely have the effect of redistributing the tax burden from high-bracket to
low-bracket taxpayers and are unlikely to improve upon the current system. Although such a
structure would probably increase saving and investment, the redistribution of the tax burden
makes this politically infeasible; therefore, this alternative is not considered further.
(3) The 1984 Treasury proposals and the 1985 Bradley-Gephardt bill (S. 409, H.R. 800
(99th Cong.)) are examples of a comprehensive, somewhat progressive income tax system
wherein individuals are subject to a three-tiered rate structure on a base that is broadened
through the elimination of many special provisions. This type of tax system will be dis
cussed in chapter 3. Note also that a comprehensive base and progressive rate structure can
be used with an expenditure base, as in the Hall-Rabushka proposal (see chapter 4).
(4) Exam ples of the comprehensive, nonprogressive income tax system are represented
by Senator Helm s’s bill (S. 2200 (97th Cong.)) and the Siliander-Nickles “ F lat 10” bill
(H.R. 200 (99th Cong.)) and, for individuals at least, the 1985 Kem p-K asten bill (S. 325,
H.R. 777 (99th Cong.)), all of which impose tax at a single rate.8 (Because such systems
7

Primary Tax Systems
Base Type

Tim ing

Extent of Base

Rate Structure

N oncom prehensive
Incom e =

(1) Progressive
(2) N onprogressive

Periodic

(3) Progressive

C om prehensive

(4) N onprogressive
Sales

(5) S ingle-rate
(6) Multi-rate

Value-added
Transactional

Production

(7) S ingle-rate
(8) M ulti-rate
(9) S ingle-rate

Retail Sales Tax

(10) M ulti-rate
(11) Progressive
Com prehensiveN on-incom e

P e rio d ic

Expenditure
N oncom prehensive

(12) N onprogressive
(13) Progressive
(14) N onprogressive
(15) Progressive

C om prehensiveC um ulative

A ccessions

(17) Progressive
N oncom prehensive

=

(16) N onprogressive

(18) N onprogressive

Current

have the potential to create savings incentives, they will be discussed in chapter 3.) The
principal distinction between the progressive and nonprogressive systems of (3) and (4) on
the chart (that is, progressivity) involves the issue of “ vertical equity” in the parlance of tax
policymakers, known better to laym en as “ ability to p a y.”
(5)—(10) A value-added tax (VAT) is a transactional consumption tax, levied on each firm
in the production and distribution chain, from the acquisition of raw materials through the
final sale to a customer. In concept, the tax is applied only to the value added by the com
pany, that is, to the excess of its sales over its purchases of goods or services from other busi
ness firms. A sales tax is simply a single-stage VAT applied at the retail level only, and
many of the advantages and disadvantages claimed for a VAT apply equally to a sales tax.
(Transactional consumption taxes are discussed in chapter 5.)
(11)-(14) A periodic-expenditure tax system taxes consumption, which can be thought of
as income less savings (or plus negative savings). Because income is the starting point for
defining consumption, the issue of comprehensiveness versus noncomprehensiveness is
basically the same as it was for an income tax. M ajor differences between expenditure and
income taxes are in the treatm ent of items that go into the concept of saving or dissaving,
since the periodic-consumption tax base allows a deduction for net savings. The noncom
prehensive structure, which would allow the exclusion of “ necessary” expenditures, m ay
be more feasible politically. The rate structure issue is, again, the same as for an income tax
system, wherein the considerations are m ainly of vertical equity. (Periodic taxes on con
sumption are analyzed in chapter 4.)
(15)-(18) An accessions tax is imposed on all incoming cash flows th at are not taxed by an
income tax, if one exists, or all cash flows, if no income tax system is present. As such, the
tax appears to be neutral regarding saving versus consumption; that is, cash flows are taxed
as the taxpayer “ accedes” to them, and beyond th at point the taxpayer has no tax incentive
either to save or consume. Savers and consumers who receive the same cash flows are
treated equally by the system. Because this report addresses only those tax systems that
encourage saving relative to consumption, no separate discussion concerning the accessions
tax is considered necessary.
8

Chapter 3

COMPREHENSIVE-INCOME TAX
The term comprehensive-income tax has been used to mean everything from a flat-rate,
nearly comprehensive system to a progressive rate, semi-comprehensive system. The mod
ifier comprehensive accurately refers only to the extent of the taxable base, although many
have used it to refer to a certain rate structure as well.
Proponents of the comprehensive income tax argue that people would save more because
marginal rates would be lower.9 Some, however, suggest that the opposite m ay occur.
Because rates would be lower, taxes would take a smaller portion of savings than they
currently do, so that one would need to save less to maintain a certain level of after-tax
savings. 10
The notion of making the taxable base more comprehensive through “ broadening” is far
from unknown to tax reformers. For example, the Tax E quity and Fiscal Responsibility Act
of 1982 and the D eficit Reduction A ct of 1984 are primarily base-broadening efforts with
few changes in tax rates. The first part of this section discusses the characteristics of a com
prehensive base. The second part discusses tax base broadening combined with rate revi
sion — the effects of a flat-rate tax versus a moderately progressive schedule. Throughout
this chapter, reference is made to the 1984 Treasury proposals and other legislative pro
posals where appropriate.

Comprehensive Base
Arnold C. Harberger made the following point in an address to the American Council for
Capital Formation:
Theoretically . . . [the comprehensive] income tax would tax individuals . . . on all income,
whatever the source, including wages and salaries, in-kind compensation, and the real increase in
the net worth of all investm ents.11
A comprehensive base system would essentially do away with most current deductions and
credits. Only a basic sustenance level of income would go untaxed through the retention of
personal and dependency exemptions. Most economic inflows provide, directly or indirectly,
the means for a taxpayer to consume or save and would be included in the taxable base. The
tax base would include such partially excluded items as capital gains, as well as transfer
paym ents from the government, such as unemployment insurance, social security, sup
plem entary unemployment income, and the like. Capital gains would be indexed to reflect
the im pact of inflation, as would deductions for depreciation. A comprehensive base would
tax more in-kind income than the current base, but the difficulty and com plexity of im put
ing the appropriate monetary value to items such as the imputed rental value of homeow
ner’s capital investments m ay make full taxation infeasible.12
The advantages of a comprehensive base are the following: (1) the tax rates needed to
raise a given amount of revenue can be lower because the more income is subject to tax; (2)
economic efficiency is increased by removing distortions caused by tax preferences; (3)
9

com plexity is reduced by elim inating the multitude of deductions and credits; and (4) fair
ness is increased by putting the same burdens on taxpayers in similar economic cir
cumstances. The Treasury proposal notes the following:
A comprehensive definition of taxable income or consumption is generally conducive to sim 
plicity and to equal treatm ent of equally situated taxpayers, while retreat from a comprehen
sive base generally involves complexity and horizontal inequity. A comprehensive tax base is
also necessary for economic neutrality, since high tax rates and discrim ination between
various ways of earning and spending income distort economic decisions. 13
A truly comprehensive base can go far in removing political and social factors from the
federal tax system, merely from the repeal of many preferences included in our present sys
tem that give incentives to particular social or economic behavior. W hile this m ay prove a
major benefit of a comprehensive base, it would always be subject to the self-discipline of
future Congresses.

Lower Tax Rates
Because a comprehensive base is broader, rates m ay be lowered, and the system will still
produce the same revenues. For instance, if adjusted gross income is used as a base (on 1984
projected figures), but with capital gains fully included, a flat rate of 11.8 percent would
raise the same amount of revenues as the current system. E taxable income (less zero bracket
amount) is used, a flat rate of 18.5 percent would be sufficient.14 Note that the latter example
is not one of base broadening, but merely the result of a shift to a flat-rate structure. One can
contrast these figures to the top marginal rate of 50 percent in the current system.

Efficiency
The current system of tax preferences for various favored types of income and expenditures
produces economic distortions in two ways. First, if the income from some particular
economic activity is either excused from taxation, or taxed at some preferential rate, then
the activity is more attractive to taxpayers. Resources tend to flow into the tax-preferred
activity from other activities with higher pretax returns, with the result — as viewed by
some — th at the real value of the economy’s output is reduced. 15
This line of reasoning implies a second efficiency cost when these exceptions to the tax
base begin to m ultiply and grow. As tax-preferred income increases as a share of the total,
and fully taxed income therefore shrinks, the tax rates needed to meet the government’s
revenue needs rise. Thus, the after-tax reward for all non-tax-preferred activities, which
generally includes work and much of saving, falls. 16
The proponents of a comprehensive base m aintain that the solution to these problems of
economic inefficiency is to broaden the tax base by repealing the tax preferences for the
various favored types of income and expenditures. A comprehensive base is more neutral
than the present system regarding investment decisions, leading to a greater flow of invest
ment funds to areas in which they are most productive, rather than to areas in which they
earn the highest rate of after-tax return. Some argue that a comprehensive system would
therefore enhance economic efficiency. For instance, W illiam Simon notes that “ it would
eliminate the grossly inefficient misallocation of capital resources that occurs in the pre
sent system, where the pattern of investment is determined as much by anomalies in the
tax law as by their true productivity. ” 17 W ithout the tax preferences, resources would be
allocated according to the before-tax social return, and marginal tax rates could be
reduced. 18
This is not to say that all deductions or tax preferences should be sum marily eliminated.
First, to the extent one believes that these preferences serve desirable objectives and are
more effective than other means of advancing them, a significant offsetting social cost
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might have to be attributed to more comprehensive taxation. 19 B ut also social benefits in
reducing political special-interest lobbying costs m ay occur because there would be a
general hesitancy to carve exceptions into a purely comprehensive base.
Second, it would be essential to retain in the law those deductions necessary to measure
income correctly.20 For example, an income tax on a small business that does not allow a
deduction for depreciation of a business computer or other office equipment can result in
the assessment of an income tax on a business that, by current income-measurement stan
dards, only breaks even, or even loses money. The end result would be to discourage busi
ness undertakings in which the nondeductible expenses are important. So, while broaden
ing the tax base generally increases economic efficiency, this benefit is lost if the tax base is
broadened beyond the measure of true economic income.21

Simplicity
Broadening the tax base is often portrayed as the ultim ate simplification. The Treasury
proposal notes the following:
Simplicity is not wondering which receipts and checks to save because the tax law is too com
plex and is constantly changing. Simplicity is not computing dozens of deductions and credits,
and wondering all the while whether other means of saving tax m ight have been missed
through ignorance of the laws.... A simple tax system would not require 41% of all taxpayers —
and about 60% of those who itemize deductions — to engage professional assistance in prepar
ing their tax returns.22
The “ pure” comprehensive system should be less complex for taxpayers and the adm in
istration. Under present law, “ the proliferation and expansion of exclusions, adjustments
to income, deductions, and credits create a major burden of paperwork and make part-tim e
bookkeepers of many Americans. ” 23 The caveat here is that, depending on the comprehen
siveness of the base, the system would add some com plexity — for example, in the deter
mination of values of fringe benefits, in-kind compensation, and so on. It is difficult to
predict how the adm inistrative aspect of taxation would be affected by this change;
however, many proponents claim simplicity to be a major strength of the comprehensive
tax.24

Fairness
Fairness is one of the advantages of base broadening most often mentioned. One per
ceived standard of fairness is the treatm ent of taxpayers at similar income levels. The
Treasury proposal notes this:
A tax th a t places significantly different burdens on taxpayers in similar economic circumstances
is not fair... .If some items of income are om itted from the tax base, or if particular expenditures
are treated preferentially, then taxpayers who are otherwise in equal positions will not be
treated equally.25
Thus, the elimination of tax preferences that cause extreme differences in tax burdens
among sim ilarly situated taxpayers can help to restore confidence in the fairness of the
system.
The elimination of these tax preferences would also enhance fairness with respect to the
tax treatm ent across income classes. Fairness across income classes is the notion that those
with high incomes should pay a greater percentage of their income in tax than those with
intermediate levels of income. The 1984 Treasury proposal states the following:
Defining the tax base comprehensively is necessary for the achievement of equity across
income classes. Any exclusion of deduction is worth more, the higher the marginal tax bracket
of the taxpayer. Moreover, wealthy taxpayers make relatively greater use of m any provisions of
the tax law th a t reduce the tax base, especially those yielding business deductions th a t result
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in the mismeasurement of economic income and produce tax shelters. As long as these tax pref
erences exist, the tax system will be less progressive th an the rate structure suggests, and high
m arginal rates will be advocated as a means of achieving progressive taxation. 26
Another standard of fairness pertains to the lifetime burden of a taxpayer; for example,
will different patterns of income or consumption alter the total tax burden over a long
period of time? The current U .S. system, with its progressive rates and annual accounting
period, m ay cause great discrepancies between taxpayers whose income and consumption
patterns vary despite mechanisms, such as income averaging, designed to m itigate this
undesirable result. Broader based systems with few deductions and flatter tax rates may
tend even more to eliminate what many consider to be an undesirable and unfair result.
Some variation in tax burdens within income groups occurs today not because of m anip
ulative tax avoidance by sophisticated investors but because of transactions such as home
purchasing and charitable giving. Elim inating those tax preferences would narrow the
variation in tax burdens, but it could also have various side-effects.27 For example, the
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction would not only increase the tax liability of
most homeowners, but would also decrease the market value of most homes, thus creating
serious problems for mortgagees who would hold over-valued mortgages.
In general, base broadening can yield substantial benefits, but all must be qualified to
some extent. As for low tax rates, the Treasury proposal notes that “ it is far better to levy
low tax rates on all income than to impose high tax rates on only part of incom e.” 28 But
when statutory marginal tax rates are reduced and the tax base is broadened simultaneously,
the effective marginal tax rate (the actual increase in tax resulting from an increase in
income) m ay not decrease; the tax rate is lower, but more marginal income is subject to
taxation.29
The efficiency case for base broadening is very strong in that eliminating tax influences
in the marketplace would cause resources to be allocated to their best uses and marginal tax
rates to be reduced, but it would be necessary to retain deductions required for a true
measure of income. Elim inating deductions and credits would sim plify the tax system, but
adding hitherto missing income items to the tax base would complicate it.
Finally, fairness suggests that all income be taxed in the same way, but some persons who
are by no means abusers of the current system — such as homeowners — might find the
elimination of tax preferences distinctly unfair (at least, as they would define fairness).

Tax Base Broadening Combined With Rate Revision
Broadening the tax base is only the starting half of the analysis of a comprehensive
income tax. The other important h alf is the progressiveness of the rate structure to be pro
posed. A nonprogressive rate structure m ay be thought of as more pro-savings, in that
marginal saving is taxed at a single rate, as opposed to progressively higher rates. However,
such a rate structure raises difficult political questions, and many have stated that a truly
nonprogressive (that is, flat) rate tax could not be a feasible alternative because of its redis
tribution of the tax burden from high-bracket taxpayers to low-bracket taxpayers. For
example, under current law, families with less than $20,000 of income pay 5.5 percent of all
individual income taxes, while those with $100,000 or more of income pay 22.2 percent.
Under a pure flat-rate tax of 16.8 percent, the $20,000 group would pay 9.5 percent of
individual income taxes, while the $100,000 group would pay 16.3 percent. Vertical equity
is a widely accepted, advocated concept that would be difficult to change.30
It is important to note, however, that the incidence of the tax burden is essentially
independent of the structure of the tax system. A broad-based income tax system m ay be
designed using personal exemptions, low income credits, and m ildly progressive rates that
will improve economic efficiency and still distribute the tax burden according to perceived
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social and political values. There would still be a shifting of tax burden from one taxpayer to
another; however, material shifts from one income class to another m ay be avoided without
undue complexity.
Finally, the effects on saving and economic efficiency of switching to a broader tax base,
with lower progressive rates or a flat-rate structure, can be separated into two categories:
those associated with differences between marginal tax rates on different activities and
those associated with the levels of the marginal tax rates. To the extent that tax revision
reduces differences in tax treatm ent of different sources or uses of income, tax-induced
economic distortions would be diminished and economic efficiency would be improved.
The effects of reducing the overall level of marginal tax rates, however, are more ambiguous.
Other things being equal, lower marginal tax rates should improve efficiency in individual
decisions to work, save, and invest. W ith these tax revisions, however, other things would
not be equal. As pointed out earlier, combining marginal rate reduction with base broaden
ing will not necessarily decrease incremental tax because more marginal income is subject
to taxation.31

Accretion Concept of Income
It should be noted that as the base is made more comprehensive it approaches the HaigSimons definition, or the accretion concept of a tax base. Economists express the accretion
system by the formula: I = A + C, where I equals income, A equals savings, or accretion in
net worth, and C equals consumption. In a pure accretion system all assets would be inven
toried each year, liabilities deducted, and the taxpayer’s net worth determined at market
value. The difference between the net worth amounts at the beginning and end of the
accounting period reflects the net increase or decrease in the market value of the taxpayer’s
command over consumption. The taxpayer’s expenditures for consumption for the period
are added to this factor to produce the taxpayer’s income for the year.
W ith respect to savings, the accretion concept of income has many shortcomings as a tax
base. As Blueprints notes, an especially serious drawback of an accretion income base is
that it leads to what is sometimes called the “ double taxation” of savings; savings are
accum ulated after paym ent of taxes and the yield earned on those savings is then taxed
again. Blueprints then goes on to point out that this has been recognized as a problem in the
existing tax law and that the investment credit, accelerated depreciation, and the special
tax rate for capital gains are techniques that have been introduced to make the tax system
more neutral with respect to savings.32
Putting the accretion concept into the statutory language of the Internal Revenue Code
means th at adjusted gross income would be expanded to include items presently excluded
by statute — tax-exem pt interest, the full amount of capital gains and losses, gifts and
bequests, and the like — and it would be further expanded to include the unrealized gains
and losses attributable to the taxpayer’s net assets. M any of the current proposals dis
cussed in the next section incorporate these accretion-type adjustments.

Approaches to a Progressive Comprehensive-Income Tax
The Treasury proposal, the Bradley-Gephardt B ill (S. 409, H.R. 800, (99th Cong.)), and
various other proposals represent an effort to achieve a greatly broadened tax base com
bined with lower marginal tax rates. Both proposals have a three-tiered progressive rate
structure and are revenue neutral in the sense that they would leave tax revenues essen
tially unchanged from what they would be under current law. Only a few deductions are
allowed from the base, with the Treasury proposal the more restrictive.
In brief, the 1984 Treasury proposals would eliminate most special tax provisions for
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individuals such as the state and local tax deduction, dividend exclusion, and capital gains
exclusion. It retains the home-mortgage-interest deduction, m edical expense deduction,
charitable contribution deduction, and IRA and Keogh deductions. Additionally, the pro
posal would index interest income, the personal interest deduction, and the costs of capital
assets for inflation.
W ith respect to business, the proposal levies a 33 percent corporate tax rate. It eliminates
most special tax provisions for corporations, such as the investment tax credit, percentage
depletion and the intangible drilling-cost deduction, corporate capital gains, the A C R S
(the proposal replaces A C R S with a new depreciation system known as the Real Cost
Recovery System). It substantially modifies the research and development credit, the
foreign tax credit, and interest expense. Also, the proposal allows corporations to deduct
one-half of dividends paid out of previously taxed earnings.
The Bradley-Gephardt “ Fair T ax” would retain the deduction for employee business
expenses, home mortgage interest, charitable contributions, state and local income taxes,
and real property taxes. Social security and veterans’ benefits would remain tax-exempt.
There would be modifications to certain current provisions, including the child care credit,
the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance, the deduction for m edical expenses
(limited to expenses in excess of 10 percent of adjusted gross income) and the $125,000
exclusion of gain on the sale of a residence. M any other special exemptions, deductions,
and credits presently available to individuals — such as those for percentage depletion,
intangible drilling costs, and the investment credit — would be repealed. The entire
amount of capital gains (without any excludable portion) would be subject to tax. This pro
posal, like the Treasury proposal, while moving toward simplification, lower tax rates, and
base broadening, is not a truly comprehensive income tax system. Instead, it is a partially
comprehensive one aimed at curbing certain investment incentives in our current system
that are perceived as being abusive or excessive.

Approaches to a Nonprogressive Comprehensive-Income Tax
The Helms B ill (S. 2200 (97th Cong.)) is a very broad-based income tax, more correctly
called a comprehensive-income tax, deleting most current preferences (deductions, exclu
sions, and credits). Special treatm ent for capital gains is eliminated, and other forms of
income that are currently partially or totally exempt would be taxed. Gifts and inheritances
would be included in the tax base, so beneficiaries and recipients would be subject to an
annual tax with no provision for current estate and gift deductions and credits. This new,
expanded base would be subject to a flat 10 percent rate.
The Siljander-Nickles “ F lat 10” (H.R. 200 (99th Cong.)) would broaden the tax base and
impose a flat 10 percent tax rate. F lat 10 would also index the personal exemption for infla
tion but would not make any revisions to the current corporate tax law. It would eliminate
most special tax provisions for individuals, such as the dividend exclusion, the homeowner
exclusion of up to $125,000 of the gain on the sale of a residence, the m edical expense deduc
tion, and th e capital gains exclusion. F lat 10 would retain the home mortgage interest
deduction, personal interest deduction, state and local tax deductions, charitable con
tribution deduction, and IRA and Keogh deductions. Finally, F lat 10 is designed to raise
approximately the same amount of revenue as our current federal tax system.
The K em p-Kasten “ Fair and Sim ple Tax A c t” (S. 325, H.R. 777 (99th Cong.)) would
dram atically sim plify the present system by broadening the base substantially and lower
ing the rate to 25 percent for individuals. However, the plan would retain many popular
deductions, including mortgage interest, charitable contributions, accelerated cost re
covery, and the tax-favored treatm ent of retirement savings and fringe benefits. The
investment tax credit and other credit incentives would be eliminated. T he Kem p-K asten
plan addresses the inherent regressivity issue with a special exclusion: 20 percent of salary
14

in the social security wage base (now slightly in excess of $39,000) would be excluded and
not subject to the flat 25 percent rate. As income rises above the wage base, the excluded
portion would be added back into the tax base at a 12.5 percent rate, raising the marginal
rate on earned income to as high as 28.4 percent [25 percent + (25 percent x 12.5 percent)].

Impact on Savings and Capital Formation
The table highlights some of the features of the Treasury proposal, Bradley-Gephardt,
and K em p-Kasten with respect to savings and capital formation.33
Table 5

Treatment of Capital Formation
Feature

Depreciation
Investment tax credit
Indexation
Depreciation
Inventory
Interest
Capital Assets
Distinction in Tax
Rates for Capital
Gains

Treasury Proposal

Bradley-Gephardt

Kemp-Kasten

Economic
No

Modified ADR
No

NCRS
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No

No
No
No
Yes

No

No

Yes

One can quickly grasp from the table what the primary omissions are under each pro
posal. The Bradley-Gephardt bill fails to take into account the effects of changes in the
general price level (except to the extent that depreciation deductions are accelerated) using
the 250-percent declining-balance method. “ Such a system in an inflationary economy
would eventually lead to substantial distortions in the measurement of the tax base,”
Pam ela B. Gann has written in Tax N o te s. 34 The K em p-Kasten bill, on the other hand,
provides for partial capital gains indexation. (The basis of a capital asset is indexed for
inflation. However, during a ten-year transition period, taxpayers may choose between an
exclusion of 25 percent of net capital gains or indexation of basis.) Ms. Gann believes that
“ it too would substantially mismeasure the tax base, from both the ad hoc nature of the
A C R S depreciation system and the decision to index only capital assets for inflation.” 35 In
contrast, the 1984 Treasury proposals are designed to achieve a more neutral taxation of
capital income.
It must be remembered, however, that a comprehensive income tax is still an income tax,
not a consumption tax, and these proposals would not eliminate the harm to saving that is
inherent in any accretion tax. To the extent that the rates under a comprehensive income
tax are lower than the rates under the present tax, the comprehensive income tax m ay be
less detrimental to saving than the present tax. However, to take one example, the elim ina
tion of the capital gains exclusion means that the tax rates on some aspects of investment
will be higher rather than lower. Thus, the comprehensive income tax proposals are
unlikely to truly solve the problem of com paratively low savings levels in our economy.
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Potential Problems of a New System
The foregoing discussion has focused, for the most part, on the merits of an alternative,
broad-based tax system. However, proponents of the current system see significant prob
lems that would be inherent in any broad-based system. Some of the potential costs of these
alternatives, then, should be considered along with the benefits.
For example, in addition to general changes in investment incentives caused by base
broadening, reducing progressivity in the tax system might adversely affect municipal
bond funding and ownership. There could be a loss of asset values since the current invest
ment tax base (that is, buildings, plant, and equipment) would no longer provide the same
levels of tax benefits through investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation. Cash
flow problems m ay arise because fringe benefits are deferred, and retirement benefits may
be taxed currently at fair market value.
A broad-based tax system would also have a potential for regressivity because of the use of a
uniform rate. There would probably be a reduction in charitable contributions, and many
industries would be affected by the elimination of their special tax advantages. Finally,
state and local tax revenues would almost certainly change because of state-income-tax
linkage to a federal tax system.

The Problem of Transition
Evaluation of the relative benefits and costs of alternative systems is only part of the process
in deciding whether to make a major change. Behavior patterns within the society, investment
decisions, financing practices, and social relationships have been based, in many respects,
on the existing tax system. W hat effect a major restructuring of the tax system would have
on these relationships and investments during the transition phase must, of course, be con
sidered. In short, even if an alternative system clearly is more beneficial, are the costs and
complexities of m aking the change acceptable?
To the extent that any change in the system would disallow deductions or increase
income with respect to investments made before enactm ent of a new tax system, it is evi
dent that serious economic displacement can occur unless there is a substantial tran
sitional period. B ut even with phase-ins or grandfathering, a new tax system would bring
with it large windfall losses in the values of many assets. Even if home-mortgage-interest
deductions were phased out over several years, for instance, homeowners might still suffer
an immediate drop in the value of their houses.36 Thus, loss of expected tax benefits with
respect to investments will almost certainly create a reduction in portfolio asset values.
Some are even concerned that a taxpayer revolt m ay result from a significant diminution
of wealth and have suggested the necessity for a lengthy phase-in period — up to tw enty or
thirty years for those who have homes as well as other investments subject to long-term
mortgages. Transactions entered into after enactm ent of a new system would be subject to
the new system at the time of the transaction. Transactions initiated before the date would
be grandfathered to assure investment maintenance. (The Treasury proposals, while
recognizing the need for liberal transition rules, do not come close to the type of liberality
described above.)
Inherent in all of this, of course, is the problem that detailed records must be maintained.
Furthermore, the very existence of transitional rules could create a situation of utmost
complexity: two different systems of taxation operating in parallel for some period of
time!
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Political Considerations
The perceived political disadvantages of a comprehensive system m ay be great. The first
problem occurs in those systems that propose “ fla t” rates. Richard Goode puts it this
way: “ I do not believe that the country is willing to accept [redistribution of taxes under a
flat tax] and to discard a feature of the income tax that is essential to reach ability to pay,
that has been present in the U .S. tax for the past 70 years.” 37 Or as Joseph M inarik notes,
“ taxpayers with higher incomes are assumed to buy nonessentials with their last dollars of
income; those with lower incomes are assumed to buy more basic items. It might follow,
then, that persons with higher incomes could afford to pay tax at a higher rate.” 38 Indeed,
the 1984 Treasury proposal recommended against a revenue-neutral flat-rate tax because of
“ the massive redistribution of tax burdens a pure flat tax would produce.” 39 B ut it should
be noted that “ though a majority of the population appears to favor progressivity on
grounds of fairness ... there is probably no agreement within that majority as to just how
progressive the tax system should be.” 40
The second political problem arises from the potential elimination of deductions. Although,
when surveyed, a majority of individuals favor a comprehensive income tax, they also favor
maintaining the deductions they currently use. The C B O ’s publication Revising the Tax
puts it clearly: “ Every special deduction, exemption, exclusion, and tax credit has a wellformed constituency, and many institutions, industries, and individuals feel dependent on
these provisions for their financial well-being.” 41 Furthermore, corporations depend heavily
on tax incentives and credits as support for increasing production and capital investment.
Dependence by both individuals and corporations is strong enough so that political pres
sures preserving one or the other favorite provision make the passage of the broadened-base
tax difficult to accomplish.
Even if the political obstacles can be overcome so that a comprehensive system was
instituted, the system would still be subject to changes. Rates would probably be lowered in
a comprehensive tax. To raise more revenues, Congress would be tem pted subsequently to
raise rates or add surcharges— possibly back to former nominal levels. Should this happen,
the comprehensive system will have served as the vehicle to raise the tax level rather than
serving its presently stated purposes.
The new tax would impose what can be tantam ount to a revolutionary change, which
may be disruptive economically and adm inistratively. To the extent that such a change
requires grandfather clauses and a lengthy transition period with parallel systems, it would
be very difficult to administer. Furthermore, even though the broad-based tax (in a pure
sense) would be pro-savings relative to the current system (because marginal rates would
be lower), it is doubtful that a pure system would be considered because of its redistribution
of the tax burden. For these practical reasons, then, the task force cannot state that such a
revolutionary change is the best choice for encouraging saving relative to consumption.
Gradual changes to the current system m ay be a better alternative.
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Chapter 4

PERIODIC CONSUMPTION TAX
The idea of taxing consumption dates to 1651, when Thom as Hobbes wrote the following:
“ For what reason is there, th at he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labor,
consumeth little, should be more charged, than he that living idely [sic] getting little, and
spendeth all he gets: seeing the one hath no more protection from the Commonwealth than
the other?” 42 Income has traditionally been perceived as the primary indicator of an ability
to pay taxes; but since the seventeenth century there have been those who argue that what a
person consumes is better evidence of well-being than what is received as income. A per
son’s ability to consume is determined by both income and wealth and changes depending
on whether income is constant and certain or is irregular and uncertain. Consumption,
however, tends to be much smoother than income and can therefore be considered a much
better index of “ ability to p ay.” M any economists and political philosophers have followed
Hobbes’s lead, asserting that income m ay be seen as a rough measure of what a person con
tributes to society (via labor, investment, and so on). Consequently, consumption m ay be
viewed as a rough measure of what a person withdraws from society. These thinkers believe
that it is more equitable to tax consumption than income.
Consumption taxes can be fashioned in many different ways. An expenditure (or “ con
sumed income” as it is labeled in the Treasury proposals) tax is levied on the total con
sumption expenditures of the individual; a sales tax is levied on the sales of goods and
services; and a value-added tax is levied on the difference between a firm ’s sales and its
purchases. Consumed-income taxes m ay be proportional or progressive; sales and valueadded taxes may be imposed at a uniform rate on all commodities or at differing rates on
various groups of commodities. Consumed-income taxes are collected from the consumer;
sales and value-added taxes are collected from the seller. A ll three varieties of taxes
will be discussed.

Basic Concepts of a Tax on Consumed Income
Sim ply stated, the base of the consumed income tax is the part of the individual’s income
that is spent in the taxable year for consumption purposes. Keeping track of one’s con
sumption outlays over a year’s time is the most direct measurement of consumed income,
but a much simpler approach is available. B y starting with the proposition that com
prehensive income includes any monetary benefit that can be used either for consumption
or net savings, consumed income m ay be determined simply by subtracting net savings
(which is the same as the change in net worth — that is, the change in one’s assets less the
change in one’s liabilities) from comprehensive income.
If it is accepted that th e b a se in a consumed-income tax system starts with comprehen
sive income less savings (or plus negative savings), two problems are encountered — defin
ing the comprehensive-income base and defining savings. To avoid the problems of a
comprehensive-income definition in relation to a consumption-based tax, Blueprints,
Aaron and Galper’s lifetime income tax, and many other statements on the subject adopt a
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cash-flow tax. In very basic terms, the comprehensive-tax base would be determined by
including all cash inflows and deducting all cash outflows allocated to saving or invest
ment. The balance would represent consumption, and tax would be paid on that amount
less appropriate exemptions.
Because of the difficulties inherent in accounting for saving or consumption when hous
ing or consumer durable goods (for example, automobiles) are concerned, Blueprints pre
sents a concept that can be central to the operation of a periodic consumption tax: the
qualified account and the nonqualified/tax-prepayment account.43 A qualified account
would be similar to an IRA: It can be established by any financial institution (including a
brokerage) that keeps records of deposits and withdrawals. The account would be perm it
ted to buy and sell any type of financial asset (stocks, bonds, savings deposits, stock or
m utual funds, futures, and the like). Investment yield (including realized appreciation)
would escape tax altogether. A taxpayer’s additions to a qualified account would be deduc
tible from the current tax base. A comparison of an individual’s balance in a qualified
account at the beginning and at the end of the tax period would determine whether that
person was a net saver or dissaver over the accounting period.
Unlike the procedure with an IRA, however, a taxpayer m ay withdraw from the qualified
account at any time and for any reason. There would be no lim its to the amounts con
tributed or withdrawn; however, any withdrawal from a qualified account is included in
the tax base for the year withdrawn. No distinction is made between “ principal” and
“ incom e.” O f course, to the extent funds are reinvested in a similar account, a correspond
ing deduction is permitted.
For example, an individual deposits $100 in a qualified savings-bank account, where it
earns 10 percent annual interest. In the year the $100 is deposited, the individual would be
allowed to deduct $100 from current receipts in computing a tax base. If, in the following
year, the taxpayer withdraws the principal plus the earned interest— now equal to $110—
that amount would be added to receipts from other sources in computing the tax base. If the
savings deposit were left in the bank instead to accum ulate interest, there would be no
current tax consequences. Any future withdrawal would add to taxable receipts in the year
it is made.
The concept of a nonqualified account is introduced to handle problems occurring with
major consumption purchases when the use of qualified accounts m ay prove cumbersome.
For example, personal housing has been considered a consumption item rather than a
savings item by various commentators. An exam ple to consider would be that of a young,
wage-earning couple, saving for the downpayment on their first home. If the amount saved
from earnings in each of the past years was placed into a qualified account, the amount has
avoided tax on that part of earnings; however, removal of the downpayment from a
qualified account in one year will subject the entire amount of that paym ent to tax.
Depending on the marginal rate structure, much of that tax m ay be at a higher bracket than
the deduction for the original deposit to the qualified account.
To avoid this type of problem, not only for housing but for other consumer durable goods,
Blueprints proposes permitting taxpayers to make deposits into so-called prepaid accounts.
The wage-earning individual placing $100 in a nonqualified savings account would not
receive a deduction for that $100 and, accordingly, would “ prepay” the tax on that amount,
even though it has been put into savings.44 However, neither the principal amount nor any
earnings on it would be subject to tax when withdrawn from the account. Investments from
nonqualified accounts would occur outside the tax system. Thus, no tax is incurred when
the nonqualified account funds are used toward the purchase of a new home.
The Blueprints study presents an analysis showing that the present value of prepayment
accounting and qualified account treatm ent is identical to both the government and the
taxpayer, barring changes in tax rates between the two years involved.45 An example will
illustrate this. An individual in the 40-percent bracket deposits $100 in an investment
account in year one, at a 10-percent annual interest rate; this person withdraws the $110 of
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accum ulated funds from the account in year two with a 40-percent marginal tax rate to use
on consumption. If the qualified-account approach was used, the government would
collect no tax in year one but would collect $44 of tax in year two, leaving the individual with
the after-tax amount of $66. On the other hand, if the $100 was deposited in a prepaid
account in year one, a tax of $40 would be collected in year one but no tax would be collected
in year two (with prepaid accounts, the incremental earnings escape additional tax).
However, the government would have achieved 10-percent earnings on the collected tax
during the second year, so it still has $44 by the end of the second year. The individual, at
the end of year two, has $110 in the account but has paid $40 of tax in year one and has
forgone 10-percent earnings on that tax liability in the second year. Economically, that per
son is left $66 after tax. Thus, at the end of year two, both the individual taxpayer and the
government are in equivalent economic positions, regardless of whether qualified or pre
paid accounts are utilized.

Illustrations of Tax-Base Components
The table below lists some of the cash inflow and outflow items that would be important
in arriving at a consumption-tax base. The discussion that follows elaborates on the treat
ment of some of the more important items. The policy that the table and discussion seek to
demonstrate is the inclusion of broadly defined income and a deduction for investment and
saving outflows.
(The discussion following the table relates back to the numbers of the table: arabic for
cash inflows, roman for outflows.)
Table 6

Consumption-Tax Inflows and Outflows
Inflows
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Outflows

Wages, dividends, interest, rents
Sale of investment assets
Gifts and bequests
Unemployment compensation, fringe
benefits
Consumer durables
Loan proceeds
Life insurance proceeds
Unincorporated business income
Qualified account withdrawals

(iii)
(iv)

Gifts and bequests
Contributions to plans

(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
(xi)
(xii)

Life insurance premiums
Business expenditures
Qualified account contributions
Charitable contributions
Necessary expenditures
State and local income taxes

Although it m ay be apparent to the reader why certain items are taxed or not in a
consum ption-based system , the discussion to follow highlights particular item s that
merit elaboration.
(2) Sale of investm ent assets. Sales proceeds would be includable in the base in full; no
attem pt would be made to determine income or loss as is done under our present system.
The theory is that a deduction would have been allowed for the full cost of the investment
when made, and the sales proceeds are now available in full for consumption. To the extent
a reinvestment of all or part of the proceeds in new savings takes place, a deduction occurs
from the base for the current year.
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(3, iii) Gifts. One option is to treat gifts as being includable by the donee and deductible
by the donor. This is defended on the grounds that the donated assets are no longer available
to the donor but are available to the donee for consumption. B y including the gift in the tax
base of the recipient, however, the burden shifts to the donee to avoid tax on that amount.
This would be done by reinvesting part or all of the gift in a deductible fashion, such as in a
qualified account, or by selling gifted property to raise funds for the tax liability. It can also
provide an opportunity for planning (or abusing, depending on the perspective) intergener
ation transfers, with high-bracket parents making gifts to low-bracket children.
If funds for the gift are withdrawn from a qualified account, the withdrawal requires
inclusion of that amount in the tax base, and the gift merely results in a zero liability on
those funds. If funds for the gift come from a prepaid or nonqualified account, the donor
may use that deduction to shelter other income.
Another option would be to have the donor “ prepay” the consumption tax on the amount
transferred. Because the tax has already been paid, the donee would not have to pay any
further taxes on either the transfer or on any returns earned by saving it. This option,
however, adds a degree of record-keeping complexity: The donee must segregate the
returns on the transferred property from all other investment income.46 This method,
however, eliminates a major criticism of the first option— th at is, the system ’s tolerance of
the “ wealthy miser” who would almost completely escape tax under a tax on consumed
income.47
A third option would be to include the gift in the tax base of both donor and donee. This
would make lifetime income the base of the consumed-income tax.48 However, this option
also amounts to double taxation of the gift — in essence, deeming the act of making the
transfer a type of consumption.49 The lifetime income tax adopts this option, but such a
method subjects the amounts bequested to an averaging provision if the amounts trans
ferred are large relative to annual income.
(3,iii) Bequests. Includable by recipients, but deductible by the estate. D eath continues
to have tax consequences, even in a consumption-tax framework. Assets transferred by will
now go into someone else’s consumption base; and, to the extent this occurs by terminating
the decedent’s interest in a qualified account, income and deduction will match.
However, when certain assets pass from a nonqualified account, the consumption tax on
the assets has been prepaid by the decedent on assets that will not be consumed. The con
cept of equity may require a tax-refund mechanism being established (perhaps by using an
averaging convention for a period of years in determining the bracket). An alternative
approach is perm itting acquisition of those assets by heirs without inclusion in the heirs’
tax base (possibly, by allowing transfer into a prepaid account of the heir).
(5) Consumer durables. Because consumer durables like homes, autos, or major ap
pliances provide flows of services over periods of years th at are not readily measured in
dollars (imputed rent, imputed transportion costs, and so forth) a practical — if not
theoretically correct — approach to dealing with such items is to treat their costs as current
consumption. Thus, no deduction would be permitted for costs of acquisition, but no tax
would be imposed on funds obtained from their sale.
The theoretical error in this approach is the forced prepayment of tax on future years’
consumption during the current year. For example, an automobile purchased for $8,000 is
expected to last for four or five years. Yet, by not perm itting any deduction for a part of that
$8,000, the future value of that consumption is currently su b je ct to ta x . H ow ever, with an
automobile or appliances, it m ay be argued that either the life of the asset or its cost is small
enough so that the prepayment is a low price to pay for sim plicity. In the case of the home,
however, financing the purchase with borrowing and the use of nonqualified accounts per
mits the distortions to be minimized or eliminated.
(6) Loan proceeds. An important advantage of the qualified/nonqualified alternative is
seen in the treatm ent of borrowing. In this context, it is expected that financing transac
tions may occur through either qualified or prepaid accounts, and depending on an individual’s
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creditworthiness, loans can be made for substantially more than the balance in an account
— resulting in both qualified and prepaid accounts with negative balances.
To the extent that a loan is taken from a qualified account, the proceeds are included in
the consumption-tax base (a deduction is permitted for proceeds reinvested in some aspect
of saving). Earlier in this chapter, discussion focused on the downpayment portion of home
ownership.In actuality, the bigger problem (because of relative dollars involved) arises
with the mortgage on the remaining purchase price. If the taxpayer takes out a mortgage loan
by means of a qualified account, he or she will have created a large inclusion in tax base with
out an offsetting deduction because the proceeds are considered used for consumption.
The nonqualified-account alternative permits significant loans for the purchase of such
goods as homes or automobiles without substantial tax payments in the year of borrowing.
Neither principal nor interest is deductible on repayment, but the tax on consumption rep
resented by use of the home or automobile is essentially deferred and paid during the period
of use.
In general, it should be noted that nonbusiness interest would not be deductible. The
exception occurs when the loan giving rise to the interest liability was taken by means of a
qualified account because the loan proceeds were subject to tax in the year of the loan. In
that event, even though loan proceeds were used for consumption purposes (college tuition,
for exam ple), both principal and interest repayments would be deductible as additions to a
qualified account.
(7, vii) Life insurance. These funds would be included in the tax base under two theories:
(1) Under general definitions of broadly based income, similar to gifts and bequests, they
would be considered includable; (2) a life insurance policy would be seen as a saving or
investment vehicle and premium paym ents would be, therefore, deductible.50 A ll pre
miums paid by policyholders for whole life insurance would be tax deductible, while pre
miums paid by employers for policyholders would not be imputed to policyholder’s tax
bases. A ll receipts from life insurance policies would be included in the tax base of the
recipient.
(8, viii) Unincorporated business. Gross receipts would be includable in the consumptiontax base. Business expenditures would be deductible in full, including capital investment.
Theoretically, the amount allocated to savings or investment is the cost of assets being used
in those sectors of the economy. To the extent that cost includes buildings or equipment,
the amount of otherwise taxable inflows allocated to buildings or equipment should
escape taxation.
As a practical matter, equipment and structures tend to be financed in some part
through borrowing. To the degree that borrowing was done by means of a qualified account
and the proceeds were invested in business property, there would be no current tax conse
quences. To the extent that an immediate windfall was sought by borrowing from a
nonqualified/prepaid account with an immediate, deductible offset for investment in a
business asset, lim its on loss carrybacks or carryovers can still be part of our tax system, and
future repayments (including interest) will be nondeductible.
Under this concept, depreciation will not come into play at all. W ith accounting for these
costs handled completely through cash flows, there will be no need for depreciation allow
ances or accounting.
(x) Charitable contributions. A theoretical argument can be made, unlike that for state
and local income taxes, that charitable contributions represent an individual decision on
how to consume available funds; therefore, a deduction from the consumption tax base
should not be allowed. An equally good argument can be made that contributions to charity
do not benefit an individual directly, except as the overall betterment of society benefits
each individual. Thus, charitable contributions m ay be seen as being more akin to gifts.
The gift analogy fails if one assumes that it will not be followed through to the end user; that
is, inasmuch as a charitable institution includes the amount of gifts in its tax base, the
institution should obtain corresponding deductions on a social-policy, if not a saving or
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investment, basis. It is not practical to include the amounts expended by charitable
organizations in the tax bases of their beneficiaries (students at a university, for instance). It
would seem practical, however, to assume that any consumption-based system adopted in
the United States would allow a deduction from the base for charitable contributions. This
was the position adopted in Blueprints. 51
(xi) Necessary expenditures. For social reasons that the body politic deems appropriate,
the base would probably be reduced further by “ necessary expenditures” (for example,
food, shelter, medicine, and clothing). Such allowance m ay be made through standard
deductions, exemptions, or both. Defining what “ necessary” means m ay be difficult; however,
the U .S. system incorporates items that were just as difficult to define but were specified
accurately to satisfy Congresses in the past. Nevertheless, the theoretical consumption
base is eroded to the extent such compromises are made.

Corporate Earnings Under Blueprints
Individuals consume; corporations do not. Thus, a comprehensive tax on consumption
(unlike that on income) need not even wrestle with the problems of corporate earnings and
how those earnings should be attributed to individual taxpayers. T hey should not; nor
should the corporate tax system, then, be retained — at least, so goes this argument in
Blueprints. 52
The significant advantage from excluding corporations from the tax system altogether
comes in giving them the ability to make business decisions unbiased by taxes. Economic
consequences — not tax consequences — would thus drive the corporate decision-making
process. The question of what is income that is subject either to tax or attribution to
shareholders does not arise. Even in a broad-based, comprehensive-income tax system,
where the corporate and individual subsystems are integrated, complex definitional prob
lems of income remain because of the need to ascertain the amounts attributable to each
corporate shareholder. No such problem arises in a consumption-based tax system.
Theoretically, the above argument m ay be correct; politically, it is likely to be untenable.
The concept of corporations “ escaping” tax is a politically sensitive one today. T hat sen
sitivity will doubtlessly not change merely because the tax system focuses on consumption
rather than income.

Corporate Earnings Under the Lifetime Tax
As an alternative, the Aaron-Galper lifetime tax (which is consumption based) would
have a two-part corporation tax.53 The first would be a tax on cash flow. The corporation
tax base would include total receipts of the corporation from all sources other than the sale
of stock less all business expenses, including investment in the paid-for year. Deductions
for business expenditures on consumption items for the benefit of employees or owners
would be denied, and the business tax base would include the proceeds from borrowing.
Corporations would be entitled to deduct all debt-service payments but no deductions for
dividends or any other cash distribution to stockholders. If firms borrowed to finance
investment, no tax would result in th e y e a r th e in v e s tm e n t w a s made; the expenditure on
the investment would just offset the proceeds from the loan. If earnings on the investment
differed from the repayment of debt, corporate cash flow and tax liabilities would be
affected.
The second element of the tax on corporations would be a withholding tax on all dis
tributions from corporations to both individuals and other corporations not subject to U .S.
taxation. This tax would apply to dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and any other cash
distribution. Exemptions from such withholding would be granted for payments into
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qualified accounts of U .S. taxpayers, but this withholding tax would be final for taxpayers
not subject to U .S. taxation. However, the international trade difficulties raised by any
switch to a consumption base should be remembered: For example, U .S. tax treaties are
based on an income tax system, and they would have to be renegotiated. Although the prob
lem is not insurmountable (witness the European experience with VAT), the effects of such
a withholding tax remain a serious consideration.

Rate Structure and Progressivity
B y definition, a consumption base is narrower than a comprehensive-income base (it
reduces that base by net saving); in order to capture the same amount of revenues as under
a comprehensive-income base, the rate structure must, of necessity, be higher. Certainly,
this would be true if the consumption tax was meeting its major planned purpose of increas
ing the base of net savings in this country. Recognizing the above, taxpayers would not find
the same drop in marginal rates under a consumption-tax base as they would under a
comprehensive-income tax base. For example, the Treasury proposals would provide a top
income-tax rate of 35 percent on individuals, using a tax base that would be more of a
comprehensive-income model. Those rates cannot be maintained under a consumptiontax approach; likewise, the rates under a consumption tax would not need to be maintained
under a comprehensive-income tax.
The potential for substantial rate reduction represents one of the most important
arguments for the comprehensive-income tax. For example, under the Treasury approach,
each additional dollar of saving or investment income would be subject to tax at no more
than 35 percent — a powerful saving incentive compared with the present system. Con
sumption-tax proponents, on the other hand, would argue that under their proposals each
additional dollar of savings or investment income would be subject to a zero rate tax, at
least until withdrawn for consumption.
While a comprehensive-consumption tax must, by definition, have a higher rate struc
ture than a comprehensive-income tax, it need not be set at higher rates than the present,
noncomprehensive income tax. Professor D avid Bradford a few years ago updated the
Blueprints rates structure (to which he had made major contributions as a leader of the
project). This rate structure was required to yield approxim ately the same distribution of
tax burdens as under 1976 tax law (when there was a top 70 percent tax on unearned
incom e). Adjusting for inflation from 1976 to 1984, Professor Bradford found that, using a
comprehensive-income tax base, exemptions would be about $3,000 per return, plus $1,900
for each taxpayer and dependent. For the model consumption-tax base, exemptions would
be about $2,800 per return, plus $1,500 per taxpayer and dependent. More importantly, the
top marginal rate for the Blueprints comprehensive-income tax model would be 38 percent
— not reached until a level of $75,300 of income was attained. The consumption tax, on the
other hand, would have a top bracket of only 40 percent, but would be reached at $56,400 of
taxable cash flow. This can be contrasted with the post-1983 system where the top rate
(joint returns) is 50 percent, but it is not reached until taxable income exceeds $162,400.54
W hile im plicit in what has gone before, it should be explicitly noted that the concept of a
progressive tax system is as applicable to a consumption tax as to an income tax. The
degree of progressivity under a consumption system is basically a matter of how pro
savings the system should be. Given the same base, progressive rates are more pro-savings
because they discourage additional consumption.
There has been criticism of consumption-tax systems on the grounds that the tax is, by
nature, regressive. Whether this criticism arises because of a common perception of a tax on
consumption as being, essentially, a sales tax or a value-added tax is not clear; nonetheless,
there is no reason why a consumption tax cannot be as progressive as budgetary or fairness
considerations dictate. Granted, progressivity brings complexity, insofar as current collec
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tion of tax is concerned. As a practical matter, those complexities are certainly no greater
than under an income tax model, and a combination of estim ated taxes and withholding
should continue to satisfy Treasury’s need for current funds.

Wealth Accumulation
A tax system that includes the return on labor (wages) in the base, that permits a deduction
for amounts allocated to investment, that allows returns on that investment to accum ulate
tax free (through the qualified-account concept), and that does away with the tax on cor
porate earnings is bound to be perceived by some as being inherently unfair, placing a dis
proportionate burden on the wage earner. W ealth seems to be concentrated in a relatively
small number of families; consequently, the ability of that fortunate minority group to take
particular advantage will undoubtedly be propounded as an important reason not to enact
the new system.
There is merit to this criticism, though there are also arguments to the contrary. For any
specific individual, there are two major sources of wealth accumulation: The first is his or
her own earnings, and it is clear that these would be included in the tax base; second,
however, is the transfer of assets from others, such as through gifts or inheritance. These
transfers would also be included in the consumption-tax base, at the same progressive rates
as return on labor. Obviously, such transfers would provide their own incentives for placing
substantial transferred assets into a qualified account to obtain a current deduction from
the base, but to the extent so allocated, the assets are not available for consumption.
Further, notions of fairness m ay be addressed through the progressive-rate structure
applied to the consumption-tax base. Obviously, such a definition of fairness will be in the
eye of the beholder; and it is bound, therefore, to flow largely from fiscal and political con
siderations. Under the present system, the concept of horizontal equity holds th at people
who are making the same income should pay the same tax. Such a concept would be irrele
vant (or at least unmeasurable) if a consumption-tax approach were to be adopted. People
whose tradition and heritage have tended to equate tax paid against the income received
with the very concept of fairness may find the new definition of horizontal equity — one in
which people who consume equally should pay the same tax — to be like playing with new
rules whose implications are not understood. Thus, the political push for strongly pro
gressive rates is likely to become even more severe under a consumption-tax approach than
has been the case heretofore.
Even if all amounts removed for consumption become subject to tax, the act of perm it
ting invested amounts to build up tax free will certainly make it easier to accum ulate
wealth than it would be under an income tax system. Since those who come into the system
with substantial wealth (including inherited wealth set aside in a qualified account) will be
able to add to that wealth free of tax, the concentration problem will be a real one. “ The
wealthy do not pay their fair share of taxes” is a comment often heard under our present
system (though invariably without a definition of what “ their fair share” is). In the absence
of other provisions, that perception is bound to increase, over a period of time, if the tax sys
tem is operating with a consumption tax.
Thus, the need for significant progressivity in a consumed-income tax system is apparent.
Further, many proponents of a consumption-tax system (including former Treasury Sec
retary Simon) recognize the likely need for a gift- or inheritance-tax structure that would be
made applicable to the most wealthy to serve the social goal of preventing undue wealth
from accum ulating in so few hands.55

Transition Issues
It is in the transition to a true consumption-tax system that many severe problems arise.
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Obviously, a tax system based on income, though more broadly defined and with additional
savings incentives, retains the basic political concepts under which the United States has
been operating for over half a century. However, even if consumption is now defined as
income less net savings, the shift from an income base to a consumption base would be a dif
ficult one.
In simple terms, a consumption system rewards the saver and penalizes the consumer,
while an income tax system penalizes the saver and takes little account of consumption.
Thus, individuals today who have accum ulated assets over a lifetime of labor — par
ticularly if the accum ulation has been with a mind to later consumption — have paid
income tax both on the return for their labor (wages) and on the return to the after-tax funds
invested (dividends, interest, and so fo rth ). Feldstein puts it this way: “ [I]ndividuals who
have accum ulated savings out of after-tax income should not be subject to a new round of
taxes when those savings are consumed.” 56
Consider, for example, a wage earner who has built a moderate stock portfolio with after
tax earnings and the reinvestment of after-tax dividends. If the tax system changed over
night to a cash-flow tax, the entire proceeds from the sale would again be subject to tax
when removed for consumption. On the other hand, should transition rules designate those
assets as tax prepaid, then appreciation on them would escape tax altogether, even though
the assets will ultimately be used for consumption. Likewise, income on wealth accumulated
prior to adoption of the new system would also escape taxation in any form if the underlying
assets were designated as prepaid.
Retired persons, or those close to retirement, would be especially hard hit by the immediate
adoption of a consumption tax where assets were considered part of a qualified account.
Very young adults just entering the labor force (particularly those with no inherited nest
egg) also would be disadvantaged: T hey are heavy consumers in those early years, with lit
tle opportunity for saving. On the other hand, those who have over generations successfully
accum ulated disproportionate amounts of wealth would be particularly advantaged by
immediate adoption of a consumption-tax system treating all assets as prepaid.
Younger families would also be hard hit by the immediate adoption of a consumption tax.
For example, a major consumer purchase like a home that is taxed as consumption may
cause an enormous redistribution of wealth away from homeowners. Such a change may
increase the price of property beyond the financial means of many families. As some in the
real estate industry m aintain, a consumption tax applied to the purchase of a home would
clearly have “ a negative im pact on the homeownership rate and economic growth.” 57
Obviously, there are important political factors to consider also. The consumed-income
tax, although perhaps attractive because it is new, is not well understood. The definition of
“ necessary expenditures” alone would become a highly charged issue, subject to exten
sive lobbying.
The state tax systems, as a m atter of survival, m ay be forced to adopt a consumption tax.
First, there may be an im pact on state and local revenues because state income tax is linked
to the federal system. Second, there m ay be massive compliance problems; taxpayers
would continue maintaining certain accounts for calculating state income tax plus the new
records necessary for the federal consumed-income tax. In the final analysis, the primary
defect of a consumed-income tax is the one shared with the personal income tax: Both
require a high degree of voluntary compliance to m aintain their effectiveness.
Although transition problems would be great, in the context of this study the consump
tion tax has many advantages. The main advantage is that it m ay well promote savings by
discouraging consumption. The virtue of this is stressed in the following quote from the Tax
Foundation: “ John Stuart M ill said the only ‘perfectly unexceptionable and just principle
of income ta x ’ is to ‘exem pt all savings.’ He believed the resultant savings would stimulate
investment in wealth-producing equipment and facilities, thus promoting the best interests
of all.” 58
The consumption tax would remove distortions between present and future consump27

tion because the rate on all savings would be zero. If corporate taxes were eliminated in con
junction with the consumption tax, distortions among business investments would also be
removed. The consumption tax eliminates double taxation of savings — one of the major
complaints about the current system.
However, a consumption tax that was revenue neutral (as compared with an income tax)
would require higher tax rates than those on an income base.59 B y definition, consumption
is smaller than income. Although taxing consumption would eliminate the distortion be
tween present and future consumption, the higher tax rates increase the distortion between
present consumption and leisure choices.
As discussed earlier, a common view, expressed here by the 1984 Treasury Report, is that
aggregate savings under a consumption tax will increase because the incentive for saving—
which then would be exem pt— would increase: “ However, because the net return to saving
would be higher, any particular goal for future consumption could be attained with less
current saving; this would reduce the need to save.” 60 T his income effect makes an
individual richer, possibly inducing that person to consume more in the present, thus
offsetting any effect from the substitution of savings for present consumption.61
M any writers suggest that consumption is a better measure than income is of the ability
to pay tax. Their argument is that lifetime income is the appropriate base for taxation, and
that annual consumption is more stable and hence a better proxy for average lifetime
income than annual income.62 This lifetime perspective allows an equal treatm ent of ta x
payers with the same endowments (or present value of lifetime incomes) .63 E quality would
then exist in the sense that the tax would be neutral to when, during a lifetime, one consumed
wealth. Now the income tax penalizes those who want to save for future consumption.64
The consumption tax can resolve many administrative problems found in the current
system (though, as discussed, it would create its own set). The tax would eliminate the need
to account for depreciation and inventories as well as the problem of defining capital
income, which is heightened by inflation. There would be no need to index for inflation at
all because expenditures would reflect current prices. Unrealized income would receive no
advantage as compared with realized capital gains because both would be taxed only when
withdrawn for consumption.65
Finally, the present U .S. tax system is not a pure income tax system, but it does contain
various elements of a consumption tax — that is, deductions for retirement savings, lack of
imputed taxable income from certain savings vehicles such as life insurance, and so forth.
Further, since the U .S. system starts with income in defining consumption, Americans are
used to working with that concept (though it is im perfectly defined from a consumptiontax point of view ). As pointed out by H arvey Galper of the Brookings Institution (and
Associate Director of the Office of Tax Analysis, Treasury Department, at the time the
Blueprints study was undertaken), the first steps toward a consumption-tax model can be
taken in the context of our present tax system; to the extent they involved scaling back
current income tax deductions, these steps can also serve to satisfy short-term revenue
requirements imposed by congressional budget committees.
Exam ples of changes that would begin a trend from an income- to a consumption-based
system include the following: treatm ent of specific items of untaxed compensation, deduc
tibility of particular types of interest, deductibility of state sales taxes and charitable con
tributions for nonitemizers, or readdressing the unified credit levels and rate levels at
which the estate and g ift t a x s tru c tu re reductions should halt.
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Chapter 5

TRANSACTIONAL CONSUMPTION TAXES:
VALUE-ADDED AND RETAIL SALES TAX
This chapter discusses two variations of transactional consumption taxes: the valueadded tax (VAT) and the retail sales tax. A VAT and retail sales tax differ significantly only
in the ways they are administered; consequently, no question exists about the effects of the
retail sales tax that would not apply equally to the value-added tax.66 Thus, the discussion
centers on the VAT — its operation, its advantages and disadvantages, and the comparison
with other taxes. The logical conclusion of such a discussion is a consideration of how a
national retail-sales tax differs from a VAT.

What is VAT?
VAT is an indirect tax — that is, a tax levied directly only on goods and services and,
therefore, only indirectly on persons. Indirect taxes include retail sales taxes, excise taxes,
and import duties (as compared with direct taxes, examples of which include individual or
corporate income taxes and gift or inheritance taxes).
Theoretically, VAT is a tax on the value added to goods or services by each separate pro
cessor in the production and distribution chain. In actuality, it is a tax on the increase in the
sales price of the goods or services as they pass through that chain. Ultim ately, however, it
is a tax on consumption— on the amount spent for the product by the final consumer. The
consumer ultim ately bears the burden of the tax, even though the actual payer of the bulk
of the tax is the manufacturer or processor.
A tax on consumption, incurred only when money is spent, puts a premium on savings as
contrasted with the bias against savings in an income tax, under which part of the income
itself must be paid to the government and cannot be saved. Accordingly, despite its politi
cal unpopularity, there are arguments that a V AT m ay increase the level of private saving
and generate a corresponding increase in capital formation and growth.

Types of VAT
A t its simplest, under VAT each processor collects a tax on sales of goods or services,
deducts the amount of taxes paid, and remits the difference to the government. If the pro
cessor pays more tax than is collected, the processor receives a refund. There are three types
of VAT, classified according to their treatments of purchases of capital items: gross product,
income, and consumption VAT.
Under the gross product VAT, no deduction is allowed for tax paid on capital items; the
payer can only recover through an increase in the selling price of goods produced directly or
indirectly by the taxed capital item. Under the income type, recovery of the VAT paid
would be allowed ratably over the life of the asset; thus, VAT paid on the purchase of a capi-
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ta l item with a five-year life would be one-fifth recovered in the year of purchase and onefifth in each of the following four years.
Both the gross product and income versions of the VAT penalize capital investment by
placing an additional tax burden on capital equipment purchases. The tax would be
imposed on the capital good itself and on the output produced by the capital good. In con
trast, a consumption-type V A T would not affect the methods of production because sub
stituting capital for labor (or vice versa) would not alter a firm ’s total taxes; it also would
not influence the decision to save or consume. The consumption type will be the only one
considered in detail here.67

Methods of Determining the VAT Base
There are three generally recognized methods of determining the tax base to which a VAT
rate m ay be applied: (1) under the addition method, the firm totals its paym ents for labor
and capital, subtracts from this sum its payments to other businesses for production
facilities, and applies the tax rate to the resulting amount; (2) under the subtraction
method, the firm subtracts all its paym ents to other businesses from gross sales and
receipts and applies the applicable VAT rate to the remainder; or (3) under the invoice (or
credit) method, the firm multiplies its total sales by the applicable tax rate and subtracts
from the resulting tax liability all of the VAT paid to suppliers, as shown by the invoices for
purchases from other firms. This is equivalent to getting a tax credit for the VAT the firm
has paid against its own VAT liability. These three alternatives are illustrated by the example
in table 7 on page 31, which is taken directly from the 1984 Treasury proposals. T h at exam 
ple assumes an economy with only three firms — one each in manufacturing, wholesaling,
and retailing. The manufacturing sector sells all of its output to the wholesale sector; the
wholesale sector buys only from the m anufacturing sector and sells all of its output to the
retail sector. The rate of tax is 10 percent.
So that the three methods of determining a VAT liability m ay be compared with the more
fam iliar income-tax-base calculation, a highly simplified profit and loss statem ent for
income tax purposes appears as exhibit 1 in Appendix A. For purposes of this exhibit, the
beginning and ending inventory is lim ited to purchased material, and no attem pt is made
to assign overhead costs to inventory. (This is because VAT theoretically depends on the
kinds of expenditures made, rather than on how they m ay be treated for financial or income
tax accounting purposes.) The various accounts reflected are identified according to
whether they are used in determining a VAT liability under the invoice, the subtraction, or
the addition method.
These illustrations are included here prim arily for the sake of being complete. It is impor
tant to demonstrate the various methods of collection and to point out that VAT can be
levied as a direct tax, but consideration of VAT has almost always been in the context of an
indirect tax. As such, the invoice method has, in practice, appeared to be the most appro
priate means of determining liability. This is the method employed by the members of the
European Economic Com m unity (EEC) and most other countries that have adopted
VAT.
To elaborate on the invoice method, the tax-collecting chain begins with the sale of raw
materials on which VAT is ch a rg e d b y th e seller at a fixed rate and rem itted by that seller to
the government. The purchasing manufacturer thereafter charges VAT on the sale of the
finished or semifinished product to another manufacturer or a distributor. However,
instead of rem itting the total collection to the government, the manufacturer is entitled to
reimbursement for the VAT paid on the purchase of the raw material. Only the difference,
or the tax on the “ value added” by the manufacturer, is paid to the government. The pro
cess is repeated by the second manufacturer or the distributor when, in turn, a sale is made
in the business cycle. VAT is charged on the total sales price, the seller self-reimburses from
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the proceeds, and only the difference is remitted to the government. When a final sale is
made — usually by a retailer to the ultim ate consumer — the tax m ay or m ay not be shown
separately, for at this point the chain comes to an end.
W hile the retailer is entitled to a reimbursement for VAT previously paid, the purchaser,
who in the capacity as the consumer of the item acquired, is not in the business of selling
goods or services, must bear the full tax cost. Thus, the VAT cost is passed through each
business operation until it is finally paid in the purchase price by the retail consumer. VAT is
intended to be a tax passed on to the ultim ate consumer, although the effect of the VAT rate
on the price the market will bear may, in some cases, force a seller to reduce the profit
margin. Thus, the producer m ay be forced to absorb some of the VAT.

Table 7

Comparison of Three Methods of Calculating
Value-Added Tax Liability
(10-percent value-added tax)
STAGE OF PRODUCTION
Firm A
Manufacturer

Firm B
Wholesaler

Firm C
Retailer

Total
Economy

ADDITION METHOD
Factor payments plus net
profit
Wages
Rent
Interest
Profit
Total
Value-added tax

$150
50
25
25

$300
100
75
25

$ 200
20
20
10

$ 650
170
120
60

250

500

250

1,000

$ 25

$ 50

$

25

$ 100

$350
(100)

$850
(350)

$1,100
(850)

$2,300
(1,300)

250

500

250

1,000

$ 25

$ 50

$

25

$ 100

$350
35

$850
85

$1,100
110

$2,300
230

100

350
(35)

850
(85)

1,300

25

$ 100

SUBTRACTION METHOD
Sales
Purchases
Value added
(sales minus purchases)
Value-added tax
CREDIT METHOD
Sales
Tax on sales
Purchases
Tax on purchases
Value-added tax (tax on
sales less tax on purchases)

(10)
$ 25

$ 50

$

(130)

Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth
(Washington, D.C.: USTD, November 1984), 3:9.
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It should be noted that the pass-through of the VAT cost applies to all purchases made by
a business, whether of goods or services. If an enterprise pays VAT on an electrical bill, on
stationery supplies, or on legal and accounting fees, the enterprise may recover the amount
on the subsequent collections of VAT made on its own billings. The system, therefore,
depends heavily on adequate invoicing, which sets out VAT as a separate item until the
final sale for ostensibly private consumption.

VAT Rates
The fewer the exceptions or modifications, the more easily the system operates. Never
theless, all the systems presently operating in Europe do grant relief to certain types of
sales, generally in one of three possible forms.
1. The sale is taxed at a reduced rate (multiple-rate system).
2. The sale is exempt.
3. The taxable base is reduced.
Multiple Rates

Perm itting two or more rates of VAT within a single production chain m ay or m ay not
decrease the total tax paid. If there is a standard rate of 3 percent and a reduced rate of 1
percent, the total tax paid does not change as long as the standard rate is applied at the end
of the chain. For instance, if an item is purchased for $100 in a transaction to which the
reduced rate (1 percent) applies, one dollar of VAT is collected and remitted. If the item is
thereafter sold for $400 in a transaction in which a standard rate (3 percent) applies, the
normal twelve dollars is collected and the seller self-reimburses for the one dollar pre
viously paid, rem itting eleven dollars to the government. The effect in such a case is merely
to shift forward the total collection of tax. If, however, the situation is reversed and the nor
mal rate is applied to the $100 purchase (meaning that a VAT of three dollars is paid upon
acquisition), and the reduced rate is applied to the $400 sale (meaning that only four dollars
in VAT is collected upon the second transaction), then total VAT collected drops from
twelve to four dollars. Thus, a reduced rate at the end of a chain will also reduce total VAT
collected. (See Appendix A, exhibits 2 and 3.)
Exemptions

The system can operate more easily if exemptions are kept to a minimum, but in most
countries using V AT many applications are placed outside the system. These include the
following businesses and transactions: (1) very small, probably retail, enterprises with
marginal annual turnovers; (2) financial transactions (life insurance, banking, security
purchases, and sales); (3) medical and educational services; (4) charitable activities; (5)
newspaper, periodical, and book sales; and (6) sales of agricultural products and food.
W hile these enterprises are required to pay VAT on most of their purchases, they do not
charge the tax on their sales. The primary result of the exemption, then, is that they cannot
recoup VAT paid through charges for the tax on sales; VAT paid becomes a cost of doing busi
ness, just like any other cost. Questions of pricing strategy and competition about how (or if)
this cost is passed to the consumer then must be answered by the entity’s management.
If the exem pt business sells mostly at retail, the inability to recover VAT m ay n o t be a d is 
advantage, because VAT is also not charged on the “ value added” by the exem pt person or
entity. When profit margins are sufficiently high, an exemption can even prove to be a com
petitive advantage. W hile a small exempt retailer m ay purchase an item for $100 and pay
the same 3 percent VAT as a larger taxable retailer, the small retailer’s price to a customer
need not include V AT and thus can be less than the amount charged by the larger retailer.
For instance, if the larger retailer’s resale price is $200, the charge is $206 (assuming a 3-
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percent VAT) to recover the three dollars paid earlier and remit the three dollars levied on
profit to the government. The smaller exempt retailer can charge something less and
perhaps still make the same profit (depending on operating costs) with a price that covers
VAT costs on purchases but not VAT on the resale.
In some cases, activities that are normally exempt may wish to have the option of electing to
be covered, especially if small profit margins do not give them any real advantage over their
larger taxable competitors. Such elections are perm itted for some activities in a number of
European systems. Other activities, like farming, m ay be granted a reduced rate that does
not affect prices as substantially as other rates but does permit the activity to recover VAT
paid on purchases— if not from VAT collected on sales, then from the government by way of
refunds. Such variants complicate the system, of course, but seem to be widespread.
Businesses that are exempt on certain lines of activity but taxable on others also present
special problems, requiring purchases to be prorated between exempt and taxable sales so
that VAT recovery is lim ited to those purchases that can be related to taxable sales.
When a person or entity is exem pt and makes a sale to a taxable person (that is, a sale
that is not at retail), the taxable purchaser, not being charged (directly, at least) for VAT,
will not be reimbursed for that cost upon resale. Thus, if the price charged for an item by an
exempt seller is $100, which in fact covered two dollars of VAT paid earlier in the chain, and the
taxable purchaser in turn sold the item for $200 in a sale to which a 3-percent VAT applies,
the latter collects six dollars and remits the entire amount to the government. As a result,
total VAT paid is eight rather than six dollars — the total tax paid in the normal case.
An exem pt stage in the course of a business chain m ay have the effect, therefore, of
increasing the total tax paid because the taxable purchaser from an exem pt seller is not
entitled to reimbursement for VAT that m ay have been paid on the item before it was
acquired. T h at is, if an exem pt seller is selling to the ultim ate consumer, that seller may
have a competitive advantage over a nonexempt seller of the same product; conversely, if
that seller is selling to a nonexempt reseller who is not the ultim ate consumer, the exempt
seller suffers a competitive disadvantage. (See Appendix A, exhibit 4.)
Zero Rate

In some cases, the government m ay allow a refund or credit for prior VAT paid, even
though a subsequent sale is exempt. Use of a zero rate is one method of overcoming the
adm inistrative problems involved in refunding or crediting taxes paid on purchases when
the subsequent sale is exempt. For example, if export sales are exempted, that is of no great
benefit to the exporter unless the taxes paid on purchases attributable to the export can be
recovered. Rather than having two categories of exem pt sales — tax recoverable and tax
nonrecoverable — the zero rating (in essence, an exempt, tax-recoverable sale) has been
devised. This way, all truly exem pt sales will be in the nonrecoverable category.
For example, the 1984 Treasury study uses the example of an urban transit service to
highlight the difference between zero-rating and exem ption.68 If urban transit service was
zero-rated, then no tax would be charged on the transit service fares. The transit system
would receive credit or refund for the VAT paid on its purchases of equipment, motor fuel,
supplies, electricity, and any other business-use items. If transit service is exempt, however,
the system providing the service will not apply tax on the fares received, and it will not
receive a credit or refund for tax paid on its various purchases.

Refunds and Credits
If a business is just commencing, or if it has heavy export or other exempt or zero-rated
sales, it is possible for its collections of VAT on sales to be materially less than it paid on pur
chases. In cases of this type, the government may refund the difference on a monthly or
quarterly basis, or it m ay require the entity to carry forward the unreimbursed VAT against
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sales of later periods. In such a case, if sales by the entity do not incur sufficient VAT to offset
VAT paid on purchases both currently and on a carryover basis, the unrecovered tax obvi
ously becomes a cost to the enterprise. Generally speaking, the refund system is preferred to
that requiring an enterprise to recover its VAT on a credit basis over an extended period of time.

Capital Goods
One interesting feature of VAT as it is usually applied is that purchases of capital goods
are included within the system. Thus, m anufacturers’ purchases of machinery and equip
ment would generally be subject to the normal rate, which would be recovered currently by
VAT collected on sales of manufactured goods. The consumption-type VAT is the Euro
pean norm, perm itting full current recovery of VAT on capital goods; however, some
authorities argue that VAT on such items should not be recovered at all (gross product sys
tem) or that VAT should be recovered only over the life of the asset on an annual pro rata
basis (income system) .69 These last two systems of VAT have not been generally accepted,
but most countries that have introduced VAT have provided transitional rules with respect
to VAT paid on capital goods. Thus, in the first year of the new VAT system, only a partial
recovery of VAT paid on capital goods is permitted; in the second year, an additional
amount is allowed, and so forth, until all VAT paid on such items is reimbursed. This
stepped phase-in to a full-consumption VAT can be crucial: Allowing full recovery of the
tax im m ediately can seriously affect the capital goods market where V AT replaced a local
sales tax that was not recoverable.
The im pact on tax revenues is another reason for going to a full-consumption system
gradually. Depending on the structure, under a sales tax the tax on capital goods m ay not
be recovered, but under a VAT all of it would be recovered in the year of sale.70 The VAT on
the sales resulting from use of the capital equipment, however, would be spread over
many years.

Advantages of VAT
In concept, the tax itself has certain advantages and disadvantages. As in other areas of
tax design, however, there are few bright-line pluses and minuses. Thus, what appears an
advantage to proponents of a VAT m ay be a distinct disadvantage to opponents, and the
following analysis of the pros and cons inevitably contains some duplication.
The proponents of a VAT frequently see its adoption as a means of encouraging savings
and of raising the billions needed by the federal government to alleviate growing budget
deficits. In doing so they often cite the following main advantages of a VAT.
Large Potential for Revenue

T h at a federal VAT has a tremendous potential for revenue is obvious. Transactional
consumption provides a much greater base than any other federal tax system presently
employed; its value base can be as large as the gross national product. The Treasury
estimates — even allowing for exemptions for vital necessities and for certain industries
and groups — that the projected 1988 VAT base would be about $2.4 trillion. Each percentage
point of a VAT levied on this total would yield about $24 billion.71
Encouragement of Savings

VAT, being a consumption-based tax, would probably be perceived by most as being
strongly pro-savings rather than being pro-consumption. Some commentators, however,
have argued that VAT is relatively neutral in this regard. Since a VAT would probably be
imposed on virtually all goods and services (whether oriented toward consumption or sav
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ing), the VAT should raise the cost of saving in the same proportion that it raises the cost of
consumption. In addition, a “ consumption V A T ,” in which the cost of capital outlays is
currently deducted from the tax base, would be tax-neutral in capital formation.
Thus, it is argued that VAT is essentially neutral toward the saving/consumption
choice.72 However, since the present U .S. system has an apparently negative effect on sav
ing, the VAT is relatively pro-savings, thereby creating a salutary effect that would make
greater investment and a higher rate of economic growth possible.73 Nevertheless, the
degree that saving would increase b y substituting VAT for part of the income taxes is dif
ficult to predict because that degree depends crucially on the elasticity of saving with re
spect to the interest rate, a figure of debate among economists. Charles M cLure, for one,
feels positive: “ If savings elasticities are near the high end of the range generally agreed to
be reasonable, a tax substitution of this type could significantly increase saving.” 74
Neutrality of Application

VAT, being based on the selling price of products, does not favor capital-intensive oyer
labor-intensive industries. The use of equity financing and debt financing does not affect
the tax except as their elements are passed on in price. Present income-tax incentives
would be nullified. The form of business organization does not affect the tax.
Encouragement of Efficient Resource Allocation

Some observers argue that business would allocate resources more efficiently if it were
freed from the income tax system ’s inducement for wasteful spending. A VAT does not tax
the business as such, but only the end product or service; consequently, all advantage
under a VAT lies in reducing the total costs of the business, as reflected in the ultim ate sell
ing price. Thus, the imposition of a VAT can well lead to capital investment (for example,
plant modernization) and consequently lower unit costs.
More Stable Revenues

In addition to the large potential for revenues, VAT is independent of profits and so it
would also avoid the fluctuations of the present U .S. tax system, resulting in a more stable,
predictable basis of federal receipts.
Ease of Administration

A VAT, argue proponents, is relatively easy to administer. The self-policing aspects of
the tax have proved to be sound in application. In an ideal VAT system with a single rate
and few exemptions, the accounting procedures would be relatively simple.
Incentive for Exports

A major reason for the institution of the VAT in Europe was the desire to harmonize taxes
on exports within the E E C . The use of exemptions or a zero rate on exports removes the tax
inhibitions and inequities on trade and ensures a uniform tax burden in each jurisdiction.
This same rationale extends beyond the E E C and encompasses all countries that are
signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G ATT). Under G A T T , all
indirect taxes on export transactions may be rebated and are not treated as export sub
sidies, which are prohibited.
Export products of a country th at relies heavily on indirect taxes carry less of the overall
tax burden and m ay have a competitive trade advantage. The imposition of a VAT does not
itself create this advantage; but to the extent that it substitutes for another tax, such as an
income tax not rebatable under G ATT, VAT provides an incentive to export. (See Appendix
A, exhibit 5.)
Since VAT is “ G ATT-legal, ” it would also carry the advantage of an approved (by treaty)
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export subsidy. The international difficulties posed to the United States from such export
incentives as Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs) or Foreign Sales Cor
porations (FSCs)would not exist.
Recapture of the Underground Economy

M any people in the public and private sectors are convinced that the present income tax
system encourages taxpayers to avoid taxes by operating outside i t — that is, by creating an
“ underground economy.” 75 Proponents of a VAT suggest that one of its major advantages
would be to reintroduce much of that underground economy into the federal tax system.
VAT can take a positive step in that direction, although underground activities such as bar
tering can still continue. The experience of foreign countries indicates th at the significance
of increased participation is somewhat overstated (for example, bartering and “ moonlight
ing” transactions still go unreported).

Disadvantages of VAT
The opponents of a federal VAT believe the present U .S. tax system works remarkably
well and would work even better if loopholes were closed, inequities were removed, and the
base was broadened. On the other hand, opponents of VAT emphasize the following
major deficiencies.
Too Much of a Revenue Potential

Fiscal 1984 corporate tax receipts approximated $56.9 billion.76 Based on Treasury
estimates of $24 billion per percentage point of VAT imposed, the corporate tax system can
be replaced with a VAT of 2.4 percent. Even adding to this figure the fiscal 1984 estimated
individual tax receipts of $296.2 billion, both individual and corporate totals can be raised
with a 14.7 percent VAT.
Perhaps the most illum inating caution about the VAT was made by a long-time advocate
of it, Dan Throop Smith: “ If a VAT leads to excessive government spending which would
not otherwise occur, the great revenue potential of VAT m ay be the best argument
against it. ” 77
Lack of Counter-Cyclical Balance

The income tax is said to be a built-in stabilizer for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. In boom
periods it drains off more revenue from the private sector, dampening an overheated
economy; on the downswing, it has the reverse effect. The relatively inelastic VAT lacks
this counter-cyclical aspect; and while it would not restrain a boom, it m ay contribute to
the decline in consumption in a recession.
Burden on New or Marginal Enterprises

A VAT would require each business, regardless of its profitability, to include a proportionate
share of the federal tax burden in its billings for goods or services. Thus, the new or marginal
business m ay not be able to meet the price competition occasioned by a reduction of income
taxes on profitable business and a replacement of tax through a VAT on all business.
Inflationary Effect on Prices

A VAT is inherently inflationary. It is an additional element of cost to be passed on to the
consumer, and it thus increases the ultim ate selling price. This cost-push principle makes
the imposition of a VAT not without risk. According to some economists, the chain reaction,
resulting from imposition of VAT, creates the possibility of an inflationary spiral.78
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On the other hand, the Treasury proposals note that the experience of countries with a
VAT confirms the view that it may generate a one-shot increase in the price level but not an
annual inflationary spiral: “ There m ay be some secondary price increases because of wage
paym ents and other business contracts th at are indexed to the general price level, but these
would be modest by comparison with the initial increase.” 79 The 1981 International M on
etary Fund study relied on by the Treasury noted that in twenty-one of the thirty-one coun
tries analyzed, the introduction of a VAT had no major im pact on the price level. Out of the
remaining ten, only one (Norway) had a rate of increase in the price level not explained by
other economic factors. The IM F study concluded that the introduction of a VAT was not
“ inherently” inflationary.80
Also, certain factors can m itigate the inflationary im pact of a VAT. If the tax is a replace
ment for other taxes, the inflationary aspects m ay be minimal. This would also be true if
governmental spending policy reduces the need for personal outlays, leaving a larger
balance for normal consumption or savings. Also, a low rate of VAT would produce relatively
little inflationary pressure; on the other hand, if the tax is substantial, both savings and
consumption would drop (unless taxpayers, through increased production, are able to
increase their total incomes to compensate for the tax).
Difficulties of Administration

The experience of foreign nations indicates that it is not as easy to administer a V AT as
was once assumed. Nations with a V A T continue to have problems with compliance and
collection; levels of VAT evasion appear to be comparable with levels of income tax evasion.
In fact, some of the adm inistrative problems are similar (for example, the difficulty of
separating business from personal expenditures). The Treasury estimates that when fully
phased in, the administration of a VAT would cost about $700 million per year and necessi
tate the hiring of about 20,000 employees over three years, in addition to the staff presently
needed to administer the income tax.81
If a VAT or a federal retail sales tax were combined with the various state sales taxes now
in existence, they could be administered through a single authority, which would increase
uniformity and decrease adm inistrative problems.82 O f course, the states would have to
agree to become part of such a national system, and such agreement would be far from cer
tain. To date, no state has taken advantage of the opportunity to completely tie its income
tax system to the federal income tax.
Lack of Incentive for Exports

The export subsidy advantage for VAT has been challenged repeatedly. VAT is not directly
a cost item to a producer, who obtains no direct benefits from its remission. It is true,
however, that a national VAT is not included in a foreign sales price, thus perm itting an
exporter to charge what m ay be considered a more competitive price abroad. To this extent,
exempting export sales from VAT can improve an exporter’s ability to compete in a
foreign market.
On the other hand, if the country of destination imposes a VAT, any advantage attribut
able to tax relief is obviously neutralized. Imposing a VAT and then rem itting it on exports
cannot act as a subsidy. However, VAT imposed in lieu of an income tax, or of an income tax
increase that would not be rebated, does shift overall tax costs from exported items. In this
context, a VAT can be said to favor exports, although it is not an outright incentive.
Regressive Nature of a VAT

As already noted, there is consensus that a relatively low rate of VAT would yield a high
total of tax revenue. However, a prime concern is that this burden would be largely
shouldered by lower income groups, who tend to consume a higher proportion of their
income than the more wealthy. Thus, the tax would likely be regressive.
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To counter this argument, some VAT proponents, after giving consideration to the flow of
government expenditures generated by a VAT, believe that the real incomes of the lowincome groups may even be enhanced. When government expenditures, directly or indirectly,
distribute proportionately greater benefits to low-income groups than their aggregate con
tribution, the tax system employed should be considered progressive. Thus, family allowances,
student grants, pensions, m edical payments, and similar social benefits — if liberalized
through VAT financing— can free individuals from having to save for these important con
tingencies, or at least having to subsidize their costs.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that regressiveness can be overcome by credits or
refunds, although no country has employed such a system. On the other hand, exemptions
for food, clothing, medicine, and other necessities are common under the Western European
VAT systems; but these exemptions extend benefits beyond those needing relief and, like
credits or refunds, add complexity.
Harming State and Local Revenue Sources

An important aspect of introducing a federal VAT or retail sales tax would be the effect on
state retail-sales-tax systems. The 1984 Treasury study, however, notes the following:
“ W hile the Federal government should be sensitive to the im pact a national sales or value
added tax would have on state and local governments, it is not clear that this should pre
clude Federal adoption of such a tax. ” 83
Presumably, VAT can be administered as a separate system more easily than the m ul
titude of state retail-sales-tax systems can, but it is also clear that the existence of two such
tax systems side by side is undesirable. The Treasury states: “ [I]t would be adminis
tratively difficult to piggyback state retail sales taxes on a Federal value-added ta x .” 84
Ideally, the federal government can collect all VAT or retail sales taxes and remit a pre
determined portion to each state. In fact, a VAT system might permit the federal govern
ment to remit revenue to the states where value was in fact added, rather than sim ply to the
states where the final retail sale took place, as would be the case under the traditional sales
tax setup. Obviously, such a single system would require a nationwide rate if either a VAT
system or a federal retail-sales-tax system was to be adopted.85 Although this appears to
encroach upon the right of the states to determine tax rates locally, the provision for
revenue sharing can have a positive long-term effect. The likely approach, then, would be
to harmonize transaction taxes as levied by the various states and thus to remove some of
the inequities existing among the various states that continue to affect interstate com
merce. The point would doubtless be made that if Europe can harmonize its tax systems
within the E E C , the United States should be able to accomplish the same sort of federalstate harmonization, with considerable overall benefit to business. As a politically practical
matter, however, it m ay never be possible to obtain the acceptance of such an arrangement
by fifty separate states.

Comparison of VAT With Other Taxes
If the U .S. government were to impose a VAT, the tax would probably be as a partial sub
stitute for other federal taxes, specifically the corporate or individual income tax. Thus
VAT m ay be used as a replacement for or as a supplement to federal taxes presently in
place.
VAT Compared With the Federal Corporate Income Tax

Economists disagree about the extent to which the corporate income tax is absorbed by
business, reducing the after-tax rate of return on labor and investment, or is merely passed
on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. This uncertainty makes it very difficult to
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compare the effects of the corporate income tax with those of a VAT, which would clearly be
reflected in prices. Although it is difficult to be certain of the extent of the difference, the
com paratively low rate of V AT (contrasted with the corporate income tax rate) provides
some likelihood that VAT would be passed on to the consumer to a greater extent than present
income taxes on business are now.
If this were the case, such an effect would have both advantages and disadvantages. On
the one hand, substitution of a VAT for income taxes would increase the after-tax rate of
return, thereby stim ulating savings and investments. On the other hand, the VAT would be
more regressive than the corporate income tax, and the increase in consumer prices would
have some inflationary effect.
Another point of comparison involves the issue of neutrality. Some economists consider
VAT a more neutral tax th a n income tax.86 There are, however, problems with this posi
tion. In recognition of political realities, Congress would probably produce a U .S. V AT sys
tem with exemptions and other complexities, or gradually add such complexities over
time, thereby eliminating much of the neutrality of the tax. Insofar as the VAT does remain
neutral, it would be so in the sense of applying equally to all business enterprises. The present
tax system has less effect on small or marginally profitable companies because of differences
in the tax rates. The introduction of a VAT m ay increase the burden on smaller and
marginal firms — an effect that m ay even hasten the collapse of marginally profitable
enterprises. Thus, in comparison with today’s corporate system, the VAT would not be
completely neutral; compared with the present income tax, it would result in a bias favor
ing larger, more profitable businesses.
VAT Compared With the Federal Individual Income Tax

O f all taxes levied by the federal government, the individual income tax yields the
greatest revenue. Its progressivity and successful self-assessment procedure have been
matters of pride to many Americans; the likelihood of it ever being completely replaced by a VAT
is practically nil. Nor is it likely that VAT would be used to reduce the personal income tax
rates because of its apparently regressive nature, certainly when compared with the progres
sive individual-income-tax rate structure. Although VAT m ay be made less regressive by
special rates, credits, exemptions, and rebates (and probably would have to be if it is intro
duced in the United States), such features would make it more complex administratively.
A VAT used as even a partial substitute for the federal individual-income-tax system
appears, therefore, to be politically unlikely. If VAT were to be adopted because of its favor
able effects on business, certain features of the present income tax system m ay then be sub
ject to modification in order to improve the system ’s progressivity.
Some economists also m aintain that high income taxes cause resources to shift outside
the economic system. T hey argue that, as income taxes increase, present consumption
replaces saving and leisure tim e replaces work.87 Such a shift results in lower production
and a lower standard of living. T he VAT, on the other hand, would encourge saving and dis
courage present consumption.

Retail Sales Tax
Forty-five of the states, the D istrict of Columbia, and many local governments have a
retail sales tax, a single-stage tax that applies on all sales to final consumers, not just those
made by re ta ile rs. A re ta il sale s tax is levied on all final or retail sales of goods and services
except those that are exem pt from tax.88 M ost of the advantages and disadvantages
claimed for a VAT would also apply to a retail sales tax, and thus only the major differences
are highlighted.
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Potential Revenue

A major advantage of a national retail sales tax would be its sizeable potential revenue.
For fiscal year 1984, the Congressional Research Service estimates that a retail sales tax
would yield between $8.1 billion and $18.2 billion per 1 percent of tax, depending on the com
prehensiveness of the sales tax base.89 Using the Treasury estimates of $3,127 trillion of per
sonal consumption expenditures for 1988, a 1-percent retail sales tax would yield between $10.9
and $24.7 billion, as compared with $24 billion for a 1-percent VAT. (See Appendix B.)
Other Advantages and Disadvantages

Another advantage of the retail sales tax is its relative ease of administration. The retail
sales tax is not in theory simpler than a VAT, but it is imposed only on the last transaction,
thereby reducing administrative costs and the number of businesses required to file returns.
Furthermore, the retail sales tax has the advantage of fam iliarity; the U .S. public knows
how a retail sales tax operates and copes daily with its adm inistrative burdens. A 1983
Gallup Poll survey, contracted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
asked this question: “ If the federal government had to raise taxes substantially, which
would be a better way to do it? ” The respondents preferred a sales tax w ith a food exem p
tion by more than a two-to-one margin instead of an increase in the personal income
tax.

Table 8

Responses to the Question:
“If the Federal Government Had to Raise Taxes Substantially,
Which Would Be the Better Way to Do It?”
(in percentages)

Increasing Individual
Income Taxes
Total Public Asked
Male
Female
Northeast
North-Central
South
West
Non metro
Metro—50,000 and over
Fringe
Central city

A New National Sales Tax
on All Purchases
Other Than Food
Don’t Know

24
25
23
31
21
21
24
21

52
53
51
40
58
55
52
57

25
22
27
29
21
24
25
22

27
25

50
46

23
30

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Changing Public Attitudes on Governments
and Taxes. (Washington, D.C.:. ACIR, 1983), 9.

VAT Compared With the Retail Sales Tax
Like a broad-based VAT, a retail sales tax that exempts all production inputs, including
capital goods, would be relatively neutral with respect to both consumption and produc
tion decisions. M ost states do not fully exclude capital equipment and other business
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purchases from the scope of the retail sales tax, unlike the exclusions under a VAT.
Although all states exclude sales for resale, including sales of goods that become physical
ingredients or component parts of goods produced by the purchaser, the states have more
limited exclusions for fuel, industrial machinery, farm machinery and equipment, office
supplies and equipment, and other business purchases not consumed directly in the pro
duction process. In practice, most states make no serious effort to exclude all purchases for
business purposes from their retail sales taxes. About 20 percent of state retail-sales-tax
revenue comes from taxing producers’ goods.
A comprehensive federal sales tax would offer the states an opportunity to “ piggyback”
the state taxes on the federal base. States would enjoy the advantage of the broadly defined
federal base, but would be free to set their own state tax rates, depending on state fiscal
needs. This would avoid any intergovernmental disputes over the proper amount of sales
tax revenue to be shared with the states. Federal-state piggybacking in this area would be
easier to apply under a federal retail-sales-tax than under a federal VAT. The Treasury
notes: “ Either tax, retail sales or value added, would be viewed by state and local govern
ment officials as encroaching on the fiscal territory of the states and would be criticized as
such, though the value added tax might be more acceptable because of its cosmetic
differences.” 90
Since a federal retail sales tax is collected only at the end of a chain of transactions, the
probability of successful evasion increases. A VAT is collected at every stage and thus has a
self-enforcing aspect lacking in a retail sales tax. T he self-enforcing aspects of a VAT,
however, appear to be overstated. M any countries find it necessary to employ a com
prehensive program of m atching the V A T remitted by the seller with claim s for credit by
the purchaser — a matching program similar to the one currently used in the United States
for dividend and interest reporting. Furthermore, with the VAT there is a problem of
fraudulent invoices to claim credit for nonexistent purchases.
Several less important differences also exist. A VAT tends to cover the service sector of
the economy more broadly than the retail sales tax. A VAT is simpler in operation for com
mercial customers: It does not require resale certificates or exemption certificates, for
example. The VAT is completely rebated on exports, whereas a portion of the retail sales
tax (on supplies, for example) m ay not be rebated. Finally, because retail sales taxes have
until now been reserved for state and local jurisdictions, the adoption of a federal retail
sales tax may create political problems, but the adoption of a VAT may also avoid some
of them.
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Chapter 6

CHANGES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Aside from major structural shifts to a comprehensive income tax or a consumption tax
(periodic or transactional), a third alternative for improving saving is to make changes to
the current tax system that discourage consumption, encourage saving, or do both. This
approach is summed up in a sentence by Senator D avid L. Boren: “ Instead of confusing this
[savings] issue by injecting a debate about a major shift in the tax structure, an evolutionary
change in the present system m ay well be preferable.” 91 Changes fall into several categories.
One method would be to add saving incentives to the system; another would be to increase
provisions that are already pro-savings. Finally, reducing deductions, exclusions, and so
forth, that are anti-savings would encourage saving relatively more than the current sys
tem does.
Appendix C includes a list of major revenue items in the present system, and serves as a
possible road map to those provisions which, because of the potential dollar effect, can be
viewed as a relatively efficient way to provide saving and investment incentives. Because
the Congressional Budget Office prepares periodic estimates of the ongoing projected
amounts of “ tax expenditures,” it is possible to be relatively confident about the revenue
im pact of specific potential changes. T h at im pact is reflected in Appendix C, based on the
last such CB O study (issued in October 1983 for the government’s fiscal years 1983-1988).
However, changes in the tax system, whose revenue effects have traditionally been
measured on a static basis, create serious questions concerning equity, sim plicity, and
economic side effects. Appendix C presents one set of views about how pro- or anti-savings
some of these changes m ay be, how broadly taxpayers can be affected, and the degree to
which adm inistrative or statutory sim plicity can be introduced from such changes. These
are, however, highly subjective views, any of which m ay provoke disagreement. (Thus,
readers of this study are cordially invited to substitute their own opinions on these subjects
and, effectively, produce their own tables as a guide for future changes to our existing
income tax system.)
Yet another incentive for saving is a savings tax credit, which would be similar in inten
tion and computation to the investment tax credit, but would be used for personal savings
rather than for business investment. Another possibility is to exclude saved income from
taxation until consumed; such a provision would effectively move the current system
toward a consumed-income tax. Finally, a schedular system m ay be instituted that would
tax saved income at a lower rate than consumed income. A ll of these proposals certainly
would encourage saving more than consumption.
S till another way to encourage saving within the present system would be to increase
provisions that are already pro-savings. The accelerated cost recovery system can be
further accelerated and investment tax credits increased. Additional incentives can be pro
vided for research and development while rates are reduced further on the first $100,000 of
corporate income (or the $100,000-level can be raised).
On the personal side, pro-savings measures m ay include the provision of added preferen
tial treatm ent for capital gains through reduction of rates or of holding periods, or of both.
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Deductible contributions to IRAs and Keogh plans can be increased, along with interest and
dividend exclusions; interest and dividends can even be wholly excluded (full exclusion of
dividends would serve to eliminate the problem of double taxation). Reduction or elim ina
tion of estate and gift taxes is yet another possibility. Finally, current provisions for indexa
tion can be increased. All these changes would tend to increase personal savings. (Non-supplyside economists would be quick to argue that the increase would come at possibly an unac
ceptable cost to the federal fisc.)
Finally, deductions, deferrals, and exclusions that produce an anti-savings effect m ay be
reduced or eliminated. Perhaps the most significant item to modify is the personal interest
deduction. The interest deduction tends to promote consumption, encouraging the flow of
funds into homes and durable goods rather than into financial assets. Furthermore, if the
interest deduction is not reduced or elim inated along with other changes, taxpayers may
sim ply borrow to increase their savings and, hence, receive double deductions.
M aking changes to the current system is certainly the alternative that is easiest to im ple
ment adm inistratively. The Congressional Budget Office takes this position: “ The pro
posals for interest exclusion, reducing the maximum rate on investment income, and
disallowing the interest deduction would require little or no change in existing pro
cedures.” 92 These proposals would probably succeed in increasing funds available for capi
tal formation, although the extent of such an increase cannot be predicted with certainty.
Hence, changing the current system is advantageous m ainly because it would encourage
current savings and would be relatively easy to accomplish.
As noted previously, if the changes simply involve new saving incentives without a con
current change in the interest-deduction provisions, taxpayers m ay simply borrow to
invest. The tax system will encourage both borrowing and investing and have little effect on
total capital formation.93 Furthermore, if the incentives are only for certain forms of
savings, they m ay sim ply shift savings from other instruments to the tax-favored forms. In
addition, the raising of exclusions for savings m ay only help high-bracket taxpayers, who
can afford to save more than the current limit.
Although these changes would be easiest to accomplish adm inistratively, the problem of
hurting political constituencies would not disappear. Tax N otes points out just one exam 
ple: “ The subsidy [the home interest and real estate tax deduction] provides has been
widely incorporated into prices and investment decisions throughout the economy and
could not be eliminated without causing significant short term losses and economic dis
location.” 94 Repealing such deductions would be difficult at best, and without repeal, the
creation of an incentive to borrow to invest looms large. Instituting new saving incentives
m ay also be difficult politically because taxpayers w ill perceive them to be inequitable to
those who cannot afford to save. Finally, the revised system would still provide economic
incentives (and, hence, disincentives) for certain investments and would require change as
soon as promoting saving was no longer the primary goal.
The alternative of changing the current tax system has its own weaknesses, as do the
others. However, it would probably not cause as large an economic disruption as those
alternatives that suggest changing everything. Furthermore, as noted previously, other
alternatives are inherently revolutionary and carry many adm inistrative problems, as well
as much uncertainty about their expected effects on saving and investment. In this sense,
changing the current system is the alternative that gives relatively more certain predic
tions about effects on saving and investment, and the means that would encourage such
activity most quickly.
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Appendix A
Value-Added Tax Examples
Exhibit 1

Income-Tax-Base Calculation
$1,000,0001

Sales, net of returns and allowances
Cost of goods sold
Beginning Inventory
Purchases
Direct labor
Supplies, etc.

$ 300,000
200,000
400,000
100,000

Total
Ending Inventory

2
1
2
1

1,000,000
(400,000)2

600,000
400,000

Gross profit
Salaries
Services, etc.
Supplies, etc.
Rent
Depreciation
Interest and taxes
Other deductions

100,0002
50,000 1
50,000 1
40,000 2
30,000 2
20,000 2
10,000 2

(3 0 0 ,0 0 0 )
100,000
50,000 2

Net profit from operations
Royalties
Income tax base
Income tax due at 46%

A cco u n ts used in determining VAT liability under either the invoice or subtraction method.
1
2Accounts used in determining VAT liability under the addition method.
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$

150,000

$

69,000

46

500

Retailer sells to consumer

aValue-Added Rate at 10 percent.
bReduced Value-Added Rate at 9 percent.

$300

—

Wholesaler sells to retailer

Manufacturer sells to wholesaler

( 1)
Purchases
by Seller

100

200

$300

600

500

$300

60a

45b

$ 30a

(2)
(3)
(4)
Value Added
Sales Price
Cumulative VAT
by Seller (Column 1 plus 2) (Column 3 times VAT Rate)

Reduced Rate at Wholesale Level

Exhibit 2

15

15

$30

(6)
Payment to Government
by Seller (Column 4 minus 5)

Total Value-Added Tax Collection $60

(45)

($30)

(— )

VAT Credit

(5)
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500

Retailer sells to consumer

aValue-Added Rate at 10 percent.
bReduced Value-Added Rate at 9 percent.

$300

—

Wholesaler sells to retailer

Manufacturer sells to wholesaler

(1)
Purchases
by Seller

100

200

$300

(2)
Value Added
by Seller

600

500

$300

54b

50a

$ 30a

(3)
(4)
Sales Price
Cumulative VAT
(Column 1 plus 2) (Column 3 times VAT Rate)

Reduced Rate at Retail Level

Exhibit 3

4

20

$30

(6)
Payment to Government
by Seller (Column 4 minus 5)

Total Value-Added Tax Collection $54

(50)

($30)

(— )

VAT Credit

(5)

Exhibit 4

Effects of an Exempt Sale at
Wholesale and Retail Levels
All Sales Taxable

Exempt Wholesaler

Exempt Retailer

$100
___10_

$100
10

$100
1 0

110

110

110

Total cost
Prepaid VAT
Value added

110
( 10)
100

110

Sales price
VAT at 10%

200
20

210

200
20

Total cost

220

210

220

220
( 20)
200

210

220

200

200

Sales price
VAT at 10%

400
40

410
41

420

Total cost

$440

$451

$420

Manufacturer sells to wholesaler
Sales price
VAT at 10%
Total cost
Wholesaler sells to retailer

Retailer sells to consumer
Total cost
Prepaid VAT
Value added

(
100
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110
10)
100

Exhibit 5

Comparison of Export Sales (VAT Versus Non-VAT) Countries

Selling price to customer in Morocco
Manufacturing cost
Insurance and freight
Duty (10% ad valorem)
Value-added tax paid out
Tax eliminated on export

Exporter of the United States

Exporter of a VAT Country

$150.00

$150.00

100.00
3.00
10.30
—
—

100.00
3.00
10.30
10.00
(10.00)

113.30

113.30

Net profit before tax
Income tax (at 46%)

36.70
16.88

36.70
14.68

Net profit after tax

$ 19.82

Total expense
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$ 22.02

(at 40%)

Appendix B
Estimated Revenue From a National Sales Tax

Estimated Revenue Yield
Per 1% Tax ($ in billions)

Base

Source

Type

Percentage
of Personal
Consumption

Fiscal Year
1983

Fiscal Year
1984

Fiscal Year
1988

Broad

79.1%

$16.7

$18.2

$24.7

Narrow

45.4

9.6

10.5

14.2

Broad

75

15.8

17.3

23.4

Narrow

35

7.4

8.1

10.9

McLure

Musgraves

Source: CRS computations are based on tax studies (McLure and the Musgraves) and aggregate personal consumption
figures (Department of Commerce and DRI).

In estimating revenues that can be generated by a broad or narrow retail-sales-tax base, James Bickley in
National Sales Tax: Selected Policy Issues used two different studies: one by Professor Charles E. McLure, and the
other by Professors Richard and Peggy Musgrave. McLure used his own judgm ent in determining which items to
exclude in order to establish a consumption tax base. His broad-based and narrow-based consumption taxes
would be levied on 79.1 percent and 45.4 percent of personal consumption expenditures, respectively. The
Musgraves used state-sales-tax exclusions in computing their base. Their broad base (encompassing 75 percent
of consumer expenditures) excluded items “ generally” excluded from state sales taxation; their narrow base (35
percent of consumer expenditures) excluded items “frequently” and “ generally” excluded from state sales taxation.
Personal consumption expenditures for fiscal year 1983 were $2,112 billion; for fiscal year 1984, they were an
estimated $2,304.7 billion. Thus, per 1-percent of tax, a retail sales tax derived from McLure’s bases would have
yielded $16.7 billion (1 percent X 79.1 percent X $2,112 billion) with a broad base, and $9.6 billion with a narrow
base for fiscal year 1983. Similar estimates can be generated for fiscal year 1984 and for the Musgraves’ data. If
nothing else, the table demonstrates the larger revenue capacity of a retail sales tax.
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Appendix C
Tax Expenditure Items — Effect on Savings
With the exception of the “ Pro-savings" column, each attribute below was evaluated on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1
means the attribute exists to the least degree, and 3 means the attribute exists to the greatest degree.
The “ Pro-savings” column uses a scale of - 3 to + 3 : zero is neutral, negative numbers are anti-savings, and
positive numbers are pro-savings.
(Note: See the third paragraph on page 42 about the subjective nature of much of this material.)

BUSINESS ITEMS

Pro
savings a

Scope of
Taxpayers
Affected

Revenue
Im pactb

Adminis
trative and
Statutory
Simplicity

3

1

2

2

Research and development deductions
and credits
Industrial-development-bonds interest
exclusion (see below for generalpurpose bonds)

3

1

3

3

1

3

3
3

3

1

3

3

2

3

3

3
3

2
—

3
1

Accelerated depreciation
Investment tax credit
Reduced rates on first $100,000 of
corporate income
Capital-gains lower rate
(also included below)
Indexation (also included below)0

3

2

1

INDIVIDUAL AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT ITEMS
Itemized deductions
Medical expenses
State and local taxes other than
real estate credits
Real estate taxes
Mortgage interest
Consumer interest
Charitable contributions

0

3

2

2

0
-3

3
3

2
3

-3

3

3
3
3

-3
0

3
3

3
2 -3

3
1

-2 e

2 -3

2

2

1e
3
-1
0
0

2

1

3

3
3
3
2

2
3
3

3
2

2

3
2

3

3

3

1

3

Deferrals and exclusions
Deferral of gain on sale of residence
Exemption of $125,000 gain on sale of
residence
Exclusion of life-insurance-policy earnings
Medical care premiums paid by employer
Social security benefits
Workmen’s compensation benefits
Private-pension-plan contributions
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Prosavingsa
Group-term life insurance

3

Unemployment insurance benefits

0

Adminis
trative and
Statutory
Simplicity

Scope of
Taxpayers
Affected

Revenue
Im pactb

3
2

2
2

3
3

Credits and other
Capital gain-lower rate
Indexation of rates d

3
3

3
3

3
—

1
1

Investment tax credit

3

FMV-basis step-up at date of death
Child-care credit
IRA contribution

3
0
3

3
3
2

2
2
1

3
2
2

0

3
2

2

Second-working-spouse deduction

2

3

-3
0
0

3
3
3

3
2-3
2-3

3
3

1

OTHER ITEMS
Exclusion of interest — state and local
general-purpose bonds
Zero bracket a m o u n tc
E xem ptionsc

2

Notes:
aln the context used in this analysis, “ Pro-savings” means the level of encouragement of individuals’ investment in private
sector financial assets and encouragement of business retention of income. “ Pro-savings” as used here includes both
increases in overall level of national saving and shifts within the components of national saving to more productive
forms of investment.
bRevenue impact is based on the following figures.
Evaluation
1
2
3

Annual Tax Expenditure*
$ 1-2 billion
2 + - 1 0 billion
10 + billion

(current year or projected future year)

*Source: Tax Expenditures: Current Issues and Five-Year Budget Projections for Fiscal Years 1984-1988
(Washington, D.C.: CBO, October 1983).
cNot included in the official listings of tax expenditure items.
d Indexation of income tax rates for individuals started for tax years beginning in 1985.
eThe exclusion of up to $125,000 of gain from the sale of a principal residence by taxpayers aged 55 years or older is
believed to work in tandem with the tax-free rollover rules. Under current law, the exclusion is an incentive for the
taxpayer to retain sales proceeds ratherthan reinvest in a more costly replacement home to gain the deferral benefit.
The exclusion, therefore, encourages investment in more productive forms.
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